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In the US, urban sprawl and the resulting loss of farmland and habitats to residen-
tial and commercial uses have drawn increasing concerns and led to the establishment
of both voluntary programs and regulatory instruments. These programs restrict a
landowners right to develop land with or without compensation. My dissertation is
a study of the e¤ectiveness and impact of those voluntary programs and regulatory
instruments.
In the rst essay, I develop and present an empirical test of the impact of Purchase
of Development Rights programs in reducing farmland loss. I use a county-level data
on the 269 counties in the six Mid-Atlantic States (Virginia, Maryland, Pennsylvania,
Delaware, New Jersey, and New York) over a 50-year time period. Using a propensity
score matching approach, I nd strong evidence that these programs have reduced
the rate of farmland loss and the acres lost.
My second essay evaluates the e¤ect of Maryland Rural Legacy (RL) program on
farmland preservation by taking into account a predisposition e¤ect, a time e¤ect,
and a crowing e¤ect. I use data on agricultural and forest parcels in three Maryland
counties (Calvert, Charles, and St. Marys) and match parcels based on the estimated
propensity that the parcels are included in a RL area. I nd that 1), the RL program
crowds in the preservation e¤orts of other programs and 2), more parcels and more
acres are preserved in RL areas than in non-RL areas due to preservation e¤ort from
RL program.
My third essay is a theoretical study on land development restriction from the En-
dangered Species Act and landowners timing to develop land. I use a two-period
framework and assume uncertainty of future land value and irreversibility of land de-
velopment decisions. I examine the conditions under which it is optimal for regulators
to compromise and the optimal strategies that allow them to balance the welfare gain
and loss from compromise. Regulators should compromise only if social welfare loss
from preemption is su¢ ciently large. Regulator can improve social welfare and re-
veal landownerstypes through di¤erentiated ex ante fees for di¤erentiated regulation
levels.
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Urban sprawl and its resulting loss of farmland and habitats to residential and com-
mercial uses have drawn increasing public concerns in the US. Those concerns lead
governments to introduce both voluntary programs and regulatory instruments to
slow down this trend. Since the 1970s, various regulations and land preservation
programs have been initiated to preserve agricultural land and habitats. Those ini-
tiatives restrict a landowners right to develop land with or without compensation.
It is important to understand how these restrictions a¤ect landownersdecisions to
ensure e¤ective and e¢ cient programs and regulations. My dissertation is a study of
the e¤ectiveness of the voluntary programs and e¤ect of regulatory instruments on
landownersbehavior.
For voluntary programs, I study the e¤ectiveness of two voluntary farmland preser-
vation programs, 1) Purchase of Agricultural Development Rights (PDR) program,
2) Rural Legacy (RL) designation that focuses on preserving contiguous large blocks
of agricultural land, habitats, and environmentally sensitive land. For regulatory in-
struments, I study landownersbehavior under the threat of the Endangered Species
Act (ESA), one of the most strict and contradictory regulations in the US. My dis-
sertation is therefore comprised of three essays, one theoretical and two empirical,
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contributing to the theoretical and empirical literature on land conversion. Empiri-
cally, I examine whether voluntary preservation programs reduce farmland conversion
at both aggregate (PDR) and parcel levels (RL designation). Theoretically, I model
how regulatory approaches inuence the timing of land development at individual
level when landowners can either negotiate or preempt (develop land before regula-
tion takes e¤ect) to protect their private benets.
1.1 Purchase of Development Rights Programs
Agricultural land preservation is benecial to the society in terms of providing su¢ -
cient food, a protable agricultural industry, open space and environmental amenities,
and a healthy urban development (Gardner, 1977). Empirical studies using vari-
ous methods suggest that non-market agricultural services, environmental amenity,
habitat, groundwater quality and open space are the most valuable attributes for
public (Kline and Wichelns, 1996a, 1996b, 1998; Fleisher and Tsur, 2000; Duke and
Ilvento, 2004; and Duke and Aull-Hyde, 2002). The communities with high develop-
ment pressures, high income or education level are more likely to establish farmland
preservation programs (Kline and Wichelns, 1994; Nelson et al., 2007). Individual
landownersparticipation increases in crop production, farm size, satisfying eligibility
criteria, farmer legacy, and distance to cities, decreases with soil quality and o¤-farm
income (Lynch and Lovell, 2003). However, individual landowners tend not to par-
ticipate preservation programs at the suburban fringes, where parcels size are smaller
and have higher development pressure (Duke, 2004).
Analyses are also conducted to evaluate the performance and welfare e¤ect of
farmland preservation programs. Lynch and Musser (2001) use a distance function
approach to evaluate the e¢ ciency level over the four objectives (to preserve more
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acres, to preserve productive farms, to preserve contiguous blocks of land, and to
preserve farms most threatened by development) for the state and county preserva-
tion programs in Maryland. With a benet transfer exercise, Feather and Barnard
(2003) assess the welfare e¤ect of PDR program nationally and suggest that even
under conservative assumption, the benets are likely to be large and may outweigh
the costs. Parks and Quimio (1996) study the preferential property tax program in
Wisconsin and nd that economic benet from preferential property tax program is
too small compared to non-agricultural benets and it alone is not likely to be ef-
fective in retaining farmland. McConnell et al. (2005, 2006) examine in detail the
Transfer of Development Rights (TDR) program in Calvert County, Maryland, and
nd that development is shifted to low-density rural area which contradicts the goal
of the program. Lynch and Carpenter (2003) nd no impact of PDR and TDR on
farmland loss rate assuming that the programs existence is exogenous. However,
Towe et al. (2008) nd that the option to preserve farmland provided by PDR pro-
gram may delay land development in Howard County, Maryland, that is, the parcels
qualied for a preservation option have a 50% lower hazard rate of being developed
than unqualied parcels.
Besides, McConnell et al. (2005, 2006) and Lynch and Carpenter (2003), the lit-
erature that examines the e¤ectiveness of permanent preservation through PDR and
TDR in retaining farmland is limited, in part because of the di¢ culties in identifying
their e¤ect empirically due to development pressures being endogenous with the ex-
istence of the programs and self-selection of parcels into a program. My chapter 2 is
therefore an empirical study of the e¤ect of the farmland preservation programs (PDR
programs) on farmland loss using aggregate data and a Propensity Score Matching
(PSM) approach. My data covers the counties in six Mid-Atlantic States (Virginia,
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Maryland, Pennsylvania, Delaware, New Jersey, and New York) over 50 year time
periods (1949-1997). I evaluate the e¤ectiveness of the programs by examining the
rate of farmland loss and the acres lost rather than enrollment in the programs. I
use a propensity score matching approach. This method has several advantages com-
pared to regression approaches. First, it excludes outliers more explicitly; second, it
does not assume that counties are equally likely to have farmland preservation pro-
grams; third, it does not impose linear functional forms on outcome equation, decision
process and unobservable terms. I nd strong evidence that these programs have sig-
nicantly reduced the rate of farmland loss and the acres lost. Specically, counties
with programs in place have experienced, all else the same, a 48-61%, and more than
2000 acres, lower loss of farmland than the others. The results are consistent across
matching over di¤erent sub-samples (e.g. matching over full sample, matching within
sample after 1978 only and matching within time period), and di¤erent matching
methods. This chapter, therefore, contributes to the literature as it is the rst one
that treats the existence of those programs as endogenous and uses a semi-parametric
approach to appropriately address this issue.
1.2 Rural Legacy Program in Maryland
As voluntary farmland preservation programs have been operating in the US for 25
years and continue to proliferate, critics suggest that these voluntary programs do
not prevent land conversion, do not maximize social benets and cannot prevent land
fragmentation (Pfe¤er and Lapping, 1995; Daniels and Lapping, 2005; Lynch and
Musser, 2001). Empirical evidences also suggest that the open space preserved by
agricultural land preservation programs increases land value. Hardie et al. (2007)
nd that the subdivision acreage required for forest increases land value in ve Mary-
4
land counties in Baltimore/Washington Metropolitan area. Geoghegan et al. (2003)
and Irwin (2002) nd that permanently preserving agricultural parcels increase the
housing price in their adjacent areas. Therefore, agricultural preservation programs
can induce more conversion of their neighboring parcels because of the preserved open
spaces (Irwin and Bockstael, 2004; Roe et al., 2004). Focusing on preserving contigu-
ous large blocks of land may provide greater benets if threshold impact or economies
of scale exist. Large blocks of undeveloped land may be needed for ecosystem services
provision such as wildlife habitat and water quality. The Rural Legacy (RL) program
introduced in 1997 in Maryland is a program that focuses on preserving large blocks
of undeveloped land. The cornerstone of the RL program is to designate RL areas,
which receive special funding to preserve farm, forest, and ecologically important
resource lands in a contiguous fashion.
The chapter 3 of my dissertation is an empirical study of the impact of the RL
program on farmland preservation by taking into account its interaction with existing
conservation programs using a parcel level data. I use data on agricultural and forest
parcels greater than 3 acres in 3Maryland counties (Calvert, Charles, and St. Marys).
With a rich set of parcel characteristics that impact both RL area designation and
farmland preservation, I conduct matches based on the estimated propensity that a
parcel is included in a RL area. I nd empirical evidence that, rst, parcels in RL
areas are predisposed to be preserved, second, RL program crowds in the preservation
e¤orts of other programs within the RL areas, and third, RL program preserves more
parcels and more acres in RL areas compared to non-RL areas due to increment in
the available funding.
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1.3 The Endangered Species Act
The voluntary preservation programs attract landowners to cooperate by compensat-
ing them for giving up development rights attached to their land. The Endangered
Species Act (ESA), however, imposes restrictions on land development without com-
pensation and therefore induces preemptive behavior (Leuck and Michael, 2003; List,
et al., 2005).
An extensive literature has been developed to discuss the compensation or tax-
ation schemes that address individual landowners non-optimal incentives. Those
non-optimal incentives lead landowners to develop land or make costly investments
under the threat of takings. The rationale for regulation is the divergence of the
private from the public value of land and the induced externalities from private land
development. Starting with Blume et al. (1984), many researchers have addressed
the issue of compensation for takings. Innes et al. (1998), Innes (1997, 2000), Shapiro
(2003) and others show that compensation can be problematic as it might distort in-
vestment decisions. Miceli and Segerson (1996) suggest a compensation scheme that
conditions payments on whether landownersland use decision is socially optimal in
the pre-regulation period.
While the mentioned studies of compensation apply directly to much of current
legislation, limiting property rights under the ESA does not generally grant compensa-
tion. Instead, compromise is introduced as a strategy for hope to provide landowners
enough incentive to protect listed species. In 1983, Congress amended the ESA by
adding section 10(a) under which a landowner or a group of landowners can obtain
an Incidental Taking Permit (ITP) from Fish and Wildlife Services (FWS) to inci-
dentally take a listed species. The section 10(a) is a strategy of compromise and to
certain extent it may reduce preemption. In exchange for an ITP, landowners have to
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prepare a Habitat Conservation Plan (HCP) that aims to minimize and mitigate the
impact of permitted land development. That is, by bearing some costs for addressing
public concerns regarding endangered species, landowners keep the right to develop
their property.
The cost of developing a HCP can be substantial as the negotiation process for an
ITP is long and elaborate. Some landowners, in order to avoid the cost, may choose
to preemptively develop their land. Leuck and Michael (2003) and List, et al. ( 2005)
nd empirical evidence that ESA induces preemptive behavior of landowners. Alter-
natively, landowners or a group of landowners may also put extra e¤ort to negotiate
with FWS and the relevant parties for more favorable terms. Or landowners can
submit an extensive HCP for a lower future development cost. Despite the criticism
that HCP favors development over species, it is argued that this way of compromise
may represent the best hope to gain landownerscooperation to protect species.
The chapter 4 of my dissertation is therefore a study of land development restric-
tion imposed by ESA, preemptive behavior, and the potential benets of compro-
mise and di¤erentiated treatment on landowners. An ITP is issued after a multilat-
eral negotiation among landowner, FWS, local administrations and interests groups.
The cost associated with an ITP may be di¤erent among landowners, which there-
fore lead to di¤erentiated regulatory stringency levels for di¤erent landowners. This
chapter addresses the issue of preemptive land development and di¤erentiated reg-
ulatory treatment on landowners. I use a two-period framework similar to Miceli
and Segerson (1996). I also assume uncertainty of future land value and the ir-
reversibility of land development decision. When regulators are perfectly informed
about landownersthreshold value above which to preemptively develop land, they
should compromise only if the social welfare loss from preemption is su¢ ciently large.
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Regulators can reach an agreement with each individual landowner in a way that just
makes the landowner slightly better o¤than if he preempts when regulators can di¤er-
entiate landowners. When they cannot di¤erentiate landowners, regulators can o¤er
a uniform regulation level which crucially depends on the distribution of landowners
propensity to preempt. When regulators are not perfectly informed about landowners
type, a mechanism is proposed to reveal landowners type through an ex ante fee (or
an extensive HCP) for a lower regulation level. This mechanism can improve social
welfare when the benets loss from preemption and/or the di¤erence in landowners
type is su¢ ciently large.
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Chapter 2
Do Agricultural Preservation Programs A¤ect
Farmland Conversion?
2.1 Introduction
Concerns about the loss of farmland and the increase in suburban sprawl led states
and counties to institute programs to arrest or slow farmland conversion. Begin-
ning in 1978, farmland preservation programs such as Purchase of Development
Rights/Purchase of Agricultural Conservation Easements (PDR/PACE) have been
established and funded to retain agricultural land. These programs usually attach an
easement to the property that restricts the right to convert the land to residential,
commercial and industrial uses in exchange for a cash payment and/or tax benet.
By 2007, more than 128 governmental entities in the US have implemented farmland
preservation programs. Among them, 78 government entities have PDR program
and have preserved over 1.89 out of 938.28 million acres of farmland nationwide by
2007 (American Farmland Trust (AFT), 2007a; AFT, 2007b; ERS, 2008). Spending
in both state and local programs to purchase these rights was $4.467 billion (AFT,
2007a; AFT, 2007b). The total amount of money spent and the acres preserved
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indicate an average easement payment as $2370.
While several studies have evaluated the impact of other types of farmland preser-
vation programs, such as (non-permanent) use-value (preferential taxation) programs
(Blewitt and Lane 1988; Gardner 1994; Lynch and Carpenter, 2003; Parks and
Quimio, 1996; Heimlich and Anderson, 2001) and Transfer of Development Rights
programs (McConnell et al., 2005), few have studied the impact of the permanent
easement conferred by the PDR/PACE programs.
Farmland preservation programs are justied on various grounds including e¢ cient
development of urban and rural land, local and national food security, viability of the
local agricultural economy, and the protection of rural and environmental amenities
(Gardner, 1977; Hellerstein et al., 2002). Empirical evidence has also been found that
those programs provide net benets to society (Feather and Barnard, 2003; Duke and
Ilvento, 2004). However, there is very little evidence of PDR programs retaining
farmland at aggregate level.
Lynch and Carpenter (2003) suggest no impact of PDR/PACE program on the
farmland loss assuming that the programsexistence was exogenous. Several studies
have suggested that expensive PDR/PACE programs have preserved too little land
or the wrong typeof farmland (MALPF Task Force, 2001; Lynch and Lovell, 2003;
Lynch and Musser, 2001; Adelaja and Schilling, 1999). Despite Marylands successful
state preservation program which has preserved 198,276 acres, 371,000 acres have been
converted to a residential or commercial use simultaneously (MALPF Task Force,
2001). Only half as much agricultural land was preserved compared to agricultural
land converted. Those evidence may suggest that the impact of those programs on
farmland loss is insignicant due to enrolling the parcels least likely to be converted.
Besides, recent evidence suggests that the positive amenities generated by these
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preservation programs may increase the demand for housing near the preserved parcels.
For example, Geoghegan, Lynch and Bucholtz (2003) and Irwin (2002) nd that
housing prices adjacent to preserved parcels can increase due to the permanency of
adjacent open space.
In this chapter, I take a comprehensive approach to study the e¤ect of PDR/PACE
program on farmland loss in a broad region over a long time period.
Assessing the impact of permanent preservation through PDR/PACE program on
farmland loss can be challenging due to the endogeneity of program establishment.
Farmland preservation programs may be established in those counties with rapid
farmland loss and/or lower levels of farmland thus the very existence of the program
itself may be predicated on farmland loss. One cannot observe the proper counter-
factual, i.e. one would like to know what would have happened to farmland loss in
county A if it had not implemented a program. However, county A cannot be in two
states simultaneously, nor can a researcher randomly assign who has a preservation
program and who does not.
I overcome some of the empirical di¢ culties by using a propensity score matching
(PSM) method to estimate the treatment e¤ect on treated. This method has several
benets rst, the matching protocol ensures that the counties with farmland preser-
vation programs will be matched to the counties without programs that are most
similar to them in terms of observable characteristics. This provides a more trans-
parent mean to decrease the inuence of outliers and dissimilar counties. Second,
because not all counties are equally likely to have farmland preservation programs,
PSM incorporates pretreatment covariates that may inuence the existence of such
a program as well as farmland loss into the propensity score calculation. Third, a
specic functional form is not assumed for outcome equation, the decision process or
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the unobservable terms. Therefore, propensity score matching may be a more appro-
priate approach because it requires fewer assumptions than an instrumental variable
approach.
Using a unique 50-year 269 county panel data set on the existence of PDR/PACE
program and farmland loss for six Mid-Atlantic States, I nd strong empirical evidence
that these programs have had a statistically signicant e¤ect on farmland loss.
The following section 2.2 provides a conceptual framework of farmland preserva-
tion from individual to aggregate level. The Propensity Score Matching method and
data are outlined in Section 2.3 and 2.4. Section 2.5 presents empirical estimation
including propensity score estimation, selection of propensity score matching meth-
ods, and balancing test. Sensitivity analysis using a Rosenbaum Bounds, Hidden Bias
Equivalents, and robustness checks using a two-stage regression and a di¤erence-in-
di¤erence approach are presented in Section 2.7. Section 2.8 is the conclusion.
2.2 Theoretical Framework
In a competitive land market, risk-neutral landowners seek to maximize the economic
return from their land given the stream of net returns. Ricardian theory states that
the protability of agricultural land is based on fertility or soil characteristics and
this fertility determines the land rent that an agricultural producer would pay. Von
Thunen, Mills and others propose that the stream of benets of living/farming at
a particular location relative to the central business district determines the rent a
person would pay. Hardie et al. (2001) combine the Ricardian and Von Thunen
models and nd that the market values of parcels in suburban counties are the sum
of the Ricardian rent and the location or accessibility rent. In the simplest form, one
can think of the market price per acre Pi of the parcel i as determined by the stream
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of rents. The market value is thus the sum of agricultural rents given the land and
locational characteristics of parcel i (Xi), Ai(Xi; t) from time t = 0 up to an optimal
conversion date t(Xi), at which time the land is converted into a residential use, and
















) and land development is irreversible. Thus to maximize the return from the land,
a landowner will set the optimal conversion date t(Xi) such that the net returns to
agriculture and net returns to residential uses are equal: Ai(Xi; t)  Ri(Xi; t) = 0.
Let there be a cumulative density function across the land and locational charac-
teristics that reects potential development likelihood that I dene as F (X). I de-
ne L(X) as the acres of land with characteristic X. Then the land in a county










In some counties, landowners are o¤ered the option of enrolling in a preservation
program which permanently removes their option to convert their land for develop-
ment. Upon enrollment, landowners receive a payment equal to the easement value,
1To simplify the model only two land uses are used. However, the landowner may maximize his
or her present value by shifting the land use to commercial, industrial or other alternative land uses.
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EVi(Xi), but retain ownership of the parcel and the stream of agricultural rent in
perpetuity. If the agricultural landowner can extract the value of the development
rights by selling them to a preservation program, the restricted market price will be






The enrollment decision depends on the land characteristic Xi and easement pay-
ment EV (Xi). I dene (Xi; EV (Xi)) as enrollment decision. Landowner choose (
(Xi; EV (Xi)) = 0; 1) to maximize their economic returns according to (2.3)




















(Ri(Xi; t)  Ai(Xi; t)) e rtdt   EV (Xi) < 0, then (Xi; EV (Xi)) = 1.
Land i that is enrolled in the preservation program will not leave agriculture at its
(previously) optimal time to develop, t(Xi). Therefore, the number of acres converted




the total acres with an optimal time to convert t(X) earlier than t, minus the
acres that are enrolled in the preservation programs. If the preservation programs
are having an impact on farmland loss, I would expect that conversion is signicantly
2While not explicitly modeled, the landowner could sell the farmland in the future with the
easement restrictions attached to the property. However, even with a new owner, no residential,
commercial or industrial development would be permitted.
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lower as depicted in (2.4).Z
fX:t(X)tg




The net e¤ect of the agricultural land preservation programs is:
Z
fX:t(X)tg
(X;EV (X))L(X)dF (X) > 0
Empirically, I would nd this result at any point of time if the preservation pro-
grams are enrolling farms that would have left agriculture by that point. Alterna-
tively, if the preservation programs are enrolling farms not threatened by conversion
at the time of evaluation (t(X) > t), I might nd the right-side of equation (2.4)
equal to the left-side at that time. Alternatively, preservation programs may not be
enrolling many farms due to inadequate incentives (EV is too low), insu¢ cient time
in operation (only began recently), and/or small budgets relative to the number of
farmland acres in the county.
2.3 Propensity Score Matching (PSM) Method
Assessing the impacts of preservation programs is di¢ cult because a county that
have high development pressures are more likely to have a PDR program. While one
can identify whether a county has a preservation program (is treated) or not (not
treated, or in my analysis, a control) and the outcome (farmland loss) conditional
on its treatment status, one can not observe the counterfactual, i.e. what would
have happened if no farmland preservation program had been established. Thus, the
fundamental problem in identifying treatment e¤ect is constructing the unobserved
counterfactuals for the counties that have establish a PDR program.
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To assess the impact of farmland preservation programs on farmland loss, I em-
ploy the propensity score matching method developed by Rosenbaum and Rubin
(1983). The PSM method is to use the counties that do not have a PDR program but
have the same observed characteristics to construct counterfactuals for the treated
counties. The observed characteristics a¤ect both a countys treatment status and
farmland loss. The impact of PDR program is therefore the di¤erence in farmland
loss between the counties that have established such programs and their constructed
counterfactuals.
This method has been used in various economic studies in di¤erent contexts. It
is used to evaluate the e¤ect of job training programs (Heckman et al., 1997; Dehejia
and Wahba, 1999, 2002; Smith and Todd, 2005a), labor market e¤ects of college
quality (Black and Smith, 2004), the labor market e¤ects of migration (Ham et al.,
2003) the plant birth e¤ects of environmental regulations (List et. al, 2003) and the
land market e¤ects of zoning (McMillen and McDonald, 2002).
This method has been adopted not only in studies using micro data, but also
aggregated level data depending on the empirical questions and available data. Brooks
(2008) applies propensity score matching techniques to study the impact of Business
Improvement Districts on crime rate using neighborhood level data in Los Angles.
Ortz, Orazeman and Otto (2007) use matching techniques and county level data to
study the impact of meat packing industry on local labor market, crime rate, and local
government spending in the 12 Mid-Western States. List et al. (2003) apply PSM
on a county level data to examine the e¤ects of air quality regulation on economic
activity. Lin and Ye (2007) use PSM and country level data to study the impact of
ination targeting (a policy that alleviates the dynamic inconsistency problem and
leads to lower ination and ination variability), on actual ination situation. Dehejia
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and Gatti (2002) use PSM to examine the relationship between child labor and access
to credit at a cross-country level.
I adopt this method to estimate the impact of farmland preservation programs on
farmland loss using county level panel data. I assign a observation as being treated if a
county in a period has at least one acre of farmland being preserved by PDR programs
(D = 1) and as control otherwise (D = 0). Let Y1, (Y0) denote farmland loss in rate
or acres if treatment has (not) occurred in a county. The Average Treatment E¤ect
on the Treated (ATT) would be the average di¤erence in the outcome variables if one
observes the outcomes for both treatment statuses. When one cannot observe both
outcomes, the matching method can be used to estimate the ATT. The matching
method compares the mean of outcomes between the treated observations with those
matched controls that have the same distribution in their observed characteristics,
X.
It is di¢ cult to match the treated and control observations based on X when the
dimension of X is large. The propensity score matching (PSM) method proposed by
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) addresses this issue by matching the controls with the
treated based on the estimated probability of selection into treatment groups. The
probability, P (D = 1jX) 2 (0; 1), is estimated using the observed characteristics, X.
Conditional Independence Assumption (CIA) is the basic assumption for matching
which says that the treatment status is random based on those observed characteris-
tics. Heckman et al. (1998) relax the CIA condition by proposing a Conditional Mean
Independence (CMI) assumption. This assumption assumes that the pre-treatment
outcome of the matched control is the same as that for the treated based on the vector
of observed characteristics, X, or the probability P (D = 1jX).
The ATT is thus the expected di¤erence in outcome Y between the treated obser-
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vations and their corresponding counterfactuals constructed from the matched con-
trols: ATT = E(Y1jD = 1)  E(Y0jD = 1) = E(Y1jD = 1)  E(Y0jD = 0; P (X)).
The CIA condition requires that the conditioning set of X needs to include all the
key variables that may a¤ect both the outcome and the existence of the programs
except the treatment state. The weaker condition, CMI assumption, allows uncon-
trolled variables but requires that the unobservables have the same impact on the
outcome for treated and control groups. In this study, X might include changes in
agricultural protability, demand on land for non-agricultural purposes, and alterna-
tive employment opportunities for farmers.
I rst match the treatment and control observations over the full sample (no
restriction) and calculate the overall treatment e¤ect. Using the full sample may
provide the best matches since counties in di¤erent geographic locations may reach
the same development stage at the same time while counties within the same state
may be at very di¤erent development stages at any given time. For example, counties
close to metropolitan areas may have experienced development pressure at an earlier
period than counties further away from a city, all else the same. Matching over the full
sample therefore has the advantage of providing better controls for treated counties
than matching within state or within time period. I then ran balance tests for matches
and calculated the average treatment e¤ect on the treated over the matched groups.
Second, because there may have been some unobservables that vary by time pe-
riod that impact farmland loss and are not captured by my estimated propensity
scores, I also conducted matching within a time period. In this case, a treated county
is restricted to match control counties within the same time period. The average
treatment e¤ect on the treated is then computed using these matched groups.
I also attempted to match within state in order to control for the heterogeneity
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across states. I nd very few matches and the matching failed the balance tests
for the covariates that change over time due to small number of available control
observations within some states that have state level programs. For example, all 3
out of the 3 counties in Delaware have farmland preserved by 1997, 20 out of 23
counties in Maryland have farmland preserved by 1987, 15 out of 20 counties in New
Jersey have farmland preserved by 1992.
2.4 Background and Data
Six Mid-Atlantic States (Delaware, Maryland, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania
and Virginia) experienced a 47% decrease in farmland between 1949 and 1997. The
Mid-Atlantic region was one of the rst to implement farmland preservation programs.
Southampton City and Su¤olk County, New York created the rst local purchase
of development rights programs in the early 1970s. Maryland and Massachusetts
each introduced state-level Purchase of Development Rights/Purchase of Agricultural
Conservation Easement (PDR/PACE) programs in 1977. By 1997, 5 of the 6 states
had a state-level agricultural preservation program under which farmland owners
could enroll their land.
These programs remove the right to convert the property to residential, com-
mercial and industrial uses through negative easements in exchange for a monetary
payment and/or income and estate tax benets. The easements applied are perpetual
restricting all future owners of the land parcels. The institutional structures of the
programs vary by minimum criteria for enrolled farms (soil quality, acreage, prox-
imity to preserved parcels), by payment mechanisms (auctions, installment, point-
system), by the source of funding (taxes, bonds, developers), and by geographic
specicity/designated zones. However, the easement restrictions are similar across
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the programs. Easement restrictions to date have been upheld by the courts (Dan-
skin 2000) and thus these programs can be seen as permanently retaining farmland.
Two di¤erent types of preservation programs were considered: state PDR/PACE
and local PDR/PACE. Data on which counties had farmland preservation programs
was collected from American Farmland Trust (AFT 1997, 2001, 2002a, 2002b). States
and counties with farmland preservation programs were contacted via email, snail mail
and telephone to collect information on how many acres they had enrolled in 1974,
1978, 1982, 1987, 1992, and 1997. Counties were credited with having a program if
any locality (township) within the county had a program that had preserved at least
1 acre. In 1974, no county had a preservation program in place. By 1997, 44% of the
counties had some preservation activity through a state or local program.
Table 2.1 presents the date of implementation, the date of rst easement purchase,
the number of acres preserved as of January 2002, and the cost of governmentally
purchased easements for the state-level programs. Table 2.2 presents the date of
implementation, the date of rst easement purchase, the number of acres preserved
as of January 2002, and the costs of governmentally purchased easements for the 29
local programs.
Other data were compiled from the Census of Agriculture and the Census of
Population and Housing at the county level for the years 1949 through 2000 (USDA,
1997, 2001; US Department of Commerce, 1950-1992, 1950-2000). I attempted to
extend my data to the 2002 Census of Agriculture. However, due to the fact that
the Census is now adjusting the data to a deal with non-responses, the data in 2002
were not comparable to those in 1949-50 through 1997. The analysis uses data on 263
counties3 and 10 time periods of 4-5 years each corresponding to the years the Census
3Independent cities of Virginia are also included in the analysis. In several cases, due to either ag-
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Table 2.1: State-level agricultural land preservation programs by 2002
of Agriculture were taken. Counties with fewer than 5 farms in 1949 were excluded
from the entire analysis: Bronx, Queens, Richmond, Kings, and New York counties
of New York state, and Arlington County of Virginia. The three observations that
have TDR program but not a PDR program are also excluded (Burlington county
in NJ in 1987, Erie county in NY in 1997, and Bucks county in PA in 1992) . This
resulted in a total of 2606 observations during the 50-year period.
The data from the Census of Population and Housing, which is collected every
10 years, was adjusted to coincide with the years of the Census of Agriculture, which
are collected every 4 to 5 years. I assumed that the variables changed at a constant
rate between the population and housing census data years. This constant change
assumption was used to interpolate the data to the years the agricultural census
were collected. Table 2.3 and 2.4 provides the names and descriptive statistics for
the variables by the full sample, the counties with farmland preservation programs
(treated) and those without (control) that are included in the analysis for 1949-
1997 and 1978-1997 respectively.
This study focus on two outcome variables: one is the rate of farmland loss and
the other is the acres of farmland lost. The rate of farmland loss for time period t is
gregation in data or actual boundary changes during the study period, counties and/or independent
cities have been combined for this analysis.
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, where At is the number of acres in the initial period. The rate
of farmland loss averaged 7.35% for each 4-5 year time period.4 The control counties
had an average rate over the 50-year period of 7.61% while the treated had a rate of
4.12%. Other di¤erences between the two groups include fewer acres of farmland in
the treated counties (110,436 acres) compared to the control counties (144,169 acres).
The outcome variable, the change in farmland acres, is calculated as (At+1   At).
Demographic variables are calculated as a percentage change use the initial year
of the time period as the ending year of the percent change calculation. Thus the
percent change in median housing value for time period t was calculated as HUt HUt 1
HUt 1
,
where HUt is the median housing value at time t.
While the census provides the most comprehensive data set over the longest period
of time and largest geographic area, it does not report to what use farmland has been
converted once it leaves agriculture. While I am fairly certain that much of the land
was converted to residential or commercial uses (irreversible conversion for the most
part), some farmland may have reverted to forest, tourism or recreational uses. Thus
the loss of farmland cannot be automatically attributed to the loss of open space and
in some cases this land could be returned to farmland without excessive cost. Given
the matching method however, I match treatment counties to control counties where
the farmland loss is irreversible. In addition, because the unit of observation is a
county, one can make no inferences about the spatial distribution or fragmentation
of the remaining farmland which may have an impact on the long-run viability of the
agricultural sector.
4Farmland is dened by the U.S. Agricultural Census to consist of land used for crops, pasture,
or grazing. Woodland and wasteland acres are included if they were part of the farm operators
total operation. Conservation Reserve and Wetlands Reserve Program acreage is also included in
this count.
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2.5 Propensity Score Matching
2.5.1 Variables included in propensity score computation
I choose a set of variables that a¤ect both the existence of farmland preservation
programs and pretreatment (pre-program) farmland loss. There are four categories
of factors that would a¤ect both participation and farmland loss. The four factors
are: benets from non-agricultural uses, agricultural prots, o¤-farm income, and
residentswillingness-to-pay to preserve farmland.
Variables that I choose to proxy non-agricultural net returns include whether a
county has been in a metropolitan area since 1950, the population level scaled by the
size of the county, median family income, and median housing value.
Metropolitan counties may have di¢ culty retaining farmland due to shorter com-
muting distance to employment centers. Population increase will increase the net
returns to residential and commercial uses and thus increase farmland loss. Metropol-
itan and growing counties may value the farmland as it becomes increasingly scarce
and they may see the loss of the environmental and scenic amenities that farmland
provided. These counties may be motivated to establish farmland preservation pro-
grams. Higher median incomes may have two impacts. One, higher median family
income may increase the demand for larger houses. Large houses usually sit on larger
parcels. Two, residents with higher income may be willing to pay more to preserve
the farmland amenities. Thus, an increase in the median family income could increase
the demand for farmland accelerating the farmland loss rate and generate higher will-
ingness to pay for the programs. Median housing value is an indicator for land prices
and thus returns to conversion.
Agricultural returns would impact farmland loss. As net agricultural returns in-
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crease, the relative value of conversion becomes higher. The number of farmland
acres, percentage of labor force in agricultural sectors, and number of farms proxy
for the local importance of agricultural sector. If the agricultural sector is strong,
farmland owners may think they have a future in agricultural activities in the county.
This condence may decrease land conversion and increase enrollment in the preser-
vation programs. A strong agricultural presence may also result in a higher level of
governmental support for the agricultural land preservation programs.
The local economy may also impact farmland loss. Farmers may supplement their
farm income and decrease their risk with o¤-farm employment, which allow them to
retain their farms. Their o¤-farm income opportunities will be better if they are better
educated. O¤-farm employment benets are proxied by the percent of the county level
population that has at least a high school. The percentage of operators with more
than 100 days o¤-farm work and the percent of farms operated by someone who owns
all of the farmland he/she farms are also included as factors that may impact farmland
loss. These factors can positively or negatively a¤ect farmland loss and enrollment in
the preservation programs.
I also include binary variables for the time periods: 1978-1982, 1982-1987, and
1987-1992 and 1992-1997. The period, 1992-1997, is the excluded category. Because
no counties had an active farmland preservation program before 1978, I cannot include
time variables for the early years.
2.5.2 Propensity score estimation
As mentioned above, CIA (CMI) condition requires that I choose a set of key variables
that a¤ects both the existence of farmland preservation programs and pretreatment
(pre-program) farmland loss. No mechanical algorithm exists that can automatically
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choose a set of variables that satises the identication conditions (Smith and Todd,
2005b). Smith and Todd (2005b) summarize two types of specication tests motivated
by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) that help choose the correct covariates to be included
in the vector X. The rst test examines whether there are di¤erences in the means
of the covariates in X between the treated (D = 1) and control (D = 0) groups after
conditioning on P (X). This strategy is implemented on the controls and treated
groups that are matched based on estimated propensity score P (X). The second
test requires dividing the observations into strata based on the estimated propensity
score before matching. Those strata are chosen so that there is not a signicant
di¤erence in the means in P (X) between treatment and control groups within each
stratum (Dehejia and Wahba, 1999). Then, within each stratum, t-tests are used to
test for mean di¤erences in each X variable between the treated and control groups. I
estimate my propensity scores using a random e¤ect logit model controlling for county
e¤ects and using the variables outlined above (Table 2.5). The specication is selected
using the balancing test strategies mentioned above: using the second method before
matching and rst method after matching.
The random e¤ect logit model passes the rst specication test. Figure 2.1 is
the distributions of treated and control groups for all 2606 observations. The X-
axis indicates the estimated propensity score, and the Y-axis indicates the percent of
observations in the treated and control groups that fall in each strata. The estimated
propensity scores for the treatment group follow a more even distribution although
with slightly more observations having high probabilities of having a program. While
the distribution of the estimated propensity scores for control group is asymmetric,
with more than 60% of the observations falling in the interval between 0 and 0.00002.
There are no treated observations below 0.00002. The common support ranges from
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Table 2.5: Estimated coe¢ cients from a random e¤ect logit model to compute propensity
scores
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Figure 2.1: Distribution of estimated propensity scores for full sample
[0.0002, 0.999]. 5 The asymmetric distribution of the estimated propensity score for
the control group requires a careful selection of the matching method to improve the
e¢ ciency of the estimated treatment e¤ect on the treated.
2.5.3 Matching methods and bandwidth selection
Several di¤erent matching methods are available. All matching estimators have the
generic form for estimated counterfactual (bYi0jDi = 1) for a treated observation i:
(bYi0jDi = 1) = X
j2(Di=0)
w(i; j)(Yj0jDj = 0)
where j is the index for control observations that are matched to the treated obser-
vation i based on estimated propensity scores (j = 1; 2; : : : J). (Yj0jDj = 0) is the
observed outcome for a control j that are matched to the treated observation i. The
5The lower bound for common support is the maximum of the minimum of estimated propensity
scores for treated and control; the upper bound is the minimum of the maximum of the estimated
propensity scores for treated and control groups.
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matrix, w(i; j), contains the weights assigned to the jth control observation that is
matched to the ith treated observation. Matching estimators construct an estimate
of the expected unobserved counterfactual for each treated observation by taking a
weighted average of the outcomes of the control observations. What di¤ers among
the various matching estimators is the specic form of the weights. The estimators
are asymptotically the same among all matching methods. But in a nite sample,
di¤erent methods can provide quite di¤erent estimators.







Yi1   (bYi0jDi = 1)i
Nearest-neighbor matching has each observation paired with the control observa-
tion whose propensity score is closest in absolute value (Dehejia and Wahba 2002).
This can be implemented with or without replacing the control and allowing it to be
matched again. Replacement guarantees that the nearest match is used. Dehejia and
Wahba (2002) and Rosenbaum (2002) both found that matching with replacement
performs as well or better than matching without replacement (in part because it
increases the number of possible matches and avoid the problem that the results are
potentially sensitive to the order in which the treatment observations are matched).
If a control is not the nearest neighbor to any treated observation, then it is not used
to compute the average treatment e¤ect on the treated. Therefore, the control ob-
servations used to compute the treatment e¤ect are those most similar to the treated
observations in terms of their observable characteristics.
Kernel matching and local linear techniques match each treated observation with
all control observations whose estimated propensity scores fall within a specied band-
width. This bandwidth is centered on the estimated propensity score for the treated
observations. The matched controls are weighted according to the density function
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of the kernel type. More control observations are utilized under the kernel and local
linear matching as compared to nearest neighbor matching.
Selection of matching method depends on the distribution of the estimated propen-
sity score. Kernel matching operates well with asymmetric distributions because it
uses the additional data where it exists but excludes bad matches. McMillen and
McDonald (2002) suggest that the local linear estimator is less sensitive to bound-
ary e¤ects. For example, when many observations have bP (X) near one or zero, it
may operate more e¤ectively than other standard kernel matching. Nearest neigh-
bor matching, however, is more likely to give biased estimation if the distributions
of propensity scores between treated and control groups are not compatible. When
the distributions are compatible, the three matching methods give similar estimators.
Given that estimated propensity scores for the control counties are asymmetrically
distributed while for the treatment counties are more evenly distributed, kernel or
local linear matching performs better than nearest neighbor matching.
Bandwidth and kernel type selection is an important issue when one selects the
matching methods. Generally speaking, a large bandwidth leads to a larger bias
but smaller variance of the estimated ATT; a small bandwidth leads to a smaller
bias but a larger variance. The di¤erence among the kernel types is embedded in
the weight they assign to the control observations that are farther away from the
estimated propensity score of a treated observation to which the controls are matched.
A trade-o¤ between bias and variance for the estimated e¤ect could exist from the
di¤erent weights assigned to those observations by di¤erent kernel types. As the
selection of bandwidth and kernel type involves a trade-o¤between bias and variance,
I need criteria that allow me to balance the two. The leave-one-out cross-validation
mechanism proposed by Racine and Li (2004) and utilized by Black and Smith (2004)
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provides such a criterion: to choose the methods (the combinations of matching
method, kernel type, and bandwidth) that minimize Mean Squared Error (MSE) for
the estimator given the distribution of the data. I employ the leave-one-out cross-
validation method taking into account balancing objectives to choose among matching
methods.
I consider three alternative matching estimators: nearest neighbor estimator, ker-
nel estimator and local linear matching estimator. I calculate the MSEs for all the
possible combinations of the three matching methods, ve kernel types (epan kernel,
biweight kernel, uniform kernel, tricube kernel, and Gaussian kernel), and ve band-
widths (bandwidth = 0:01; 0:02; : : : ; 0:5; 0:1). Table 2.6 are the calculated MSE for all
combinations for matching without restriction, and table 2.7 for restricting matching
within time period.
I nd several interesting results in MSE values for matching without restriction.
First, the nearest neighbor estimator performs worse than the kernel matching and
local linear matching for all kernel types. The MSEs for nearest neighbor matching,
which are around 0:037, are much larger than those for the other matching meth-
ods, which range from 0:013 to 0:017. This result is consistent with other empirical
exercises that found the nearest neighbor matching provided a worse result with
asymmetrically distributed estimated propensity score for the control group. Second,
while tricube local linear matching with bandwidth 0:04 and below (0:013) performs
a bit better than kernel matching, local linear matching with the other kernel types
preform worse than kernel matching with all kernel types. However, the di¤erence in
MSE between the two matching methods is very small. This suggests that the two
methods perform similarly.
For matching within time period, I nd again that the MSEs for nearest neighbor
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Table 2.6: MSE for the combinations of matching methods, kernel types and bandwidth for
matching without restriction
Table 2.7: MSE for the combinations of matching methods, kernel types and bandwidth for
matching within time period
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matching (0:037) are much larger than that for kernel and local linear matching (0:012
to 0:11). However, the local linear matching generally performs worse than kernel
matching for all kernel types. The MSEs for local linear matching (0:0123 to 0:11)
are larger than that for kernel matching (0:0121 to 0:0126) for all kernel type except for
kernel type of tricube. Third, the MSE for kernel matching across di¤erent bandwidth
are very similar. Due to the similarity in performance for matching without restriction
and that local linear matching performs worse for matching within time period, I
rely on the uniform kernel matching with bandwidth 0:02 and epan kernel matching
with bandwidth 0:02 to construct the matched treated and control counties for both
matching scenarios. The two methods also provide me with better balance between
the control and treatment covariates than other methods and bandwidths.
2.5.4 Balancing test
I rely on two of the balancing tests that exist in the empirical literature: standard-
ized di¤erence test and a regression-based test.6 The rst method is a t-test for
equality of the means for each covariate in the matched treated and control groups,
which also serves as one of the specication test strategies. The regression test es-
timates coe¢ cients for each covariate on polynomials of the estimated propensity
scores, [\P (X)]l and the interaction of these polynomials with the treatment binary
variable, D [\P (X)]l ( l is the order of the polynomial. I set l equals 3). If these
estimated coe¢ cients on the interacted terms are jointly equal to zero according to
6Hotelling test is another balancing test strategy. The strategy tests the joint null of equal means
of all of the variables included in the matching between the treatment group and the matched control
group. Smith and Todd (2005b) found that in some cases this test incorrectly treated matched
weights as xed rather than random. Therefore I do not use this balancing test.
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an F-test, the balancing condition is satised.
The two balancing tests give similar results (Table 2.8 and 2.9). The balancing
criteria are satised for most of my key covariates for matching without restriction
using the regression test and the standardized di¤erence test for both matching pro-
tocols (uniform kernel and epan kernel matching) except for percentage of county
population that has at least a high school education, number of farms, percentage of
operators with more than 100 days o¤-farm work (fails the regression test only) and
time dummies. The percentage of county population that has at least a high school
education for treated and control group are 0:71 and 0:72 respectively. The mean of
number of farms for treated and control groups are 782 and 655 respectively. The
bivariate variable for the time periods are not balanced except for of 1979 through
1982, 1983 through 1987, and 1988 through 1992.
When limiting matches to within the same time period, most covariates are bal-
anced except the number of farms in a county. However, I nd all covariates are
balanced when restricting matching within common support.
2.6 Results
I compute the estimated impacts of farmland preservation programs for two di¤erent
time periods: the rst is post-1978 through 1997 and second, the full period from
1949 to 1997. Between 1949 and 1978, states began to introduce preferential or
use-value property taxation but did so at varying points in time. By 1978, all six
states had some types of preferential taxation programs. The introduction of these
preferential taxation programs could confound the results for the 1949-1978 time
frame. In addition, prior to 1978, no state had established and enrolled land in a
farmland preservation program. Therefore, A more pure estimate could be derived
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Table 2.8: Balancing test for the distribution of the variables between matched treated and
control groups for observations after 1978: covariates that are not balanced.
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Table 2.9: Balancing test for the distribution of the variables between matched treated and
control groups for observations 1949-1997: covariates that are not balanced
from the post-1978 time period. The estimates of the impact of existence of an
agricultural preservation program on farmland loss appear in Table 2.10 for the 1978
to 1997 time period and Table 2.11 for the 1949 to 1997 time period. The bootstrap
standard errors are reported in the second row of each matching protocol in the
tables.7 All estimated treatment e¤ects are corrected for bias and are statistically
signicant.
For the rate of farmland loss, the average treatment e¤ects on the treated of each
matching protocol for 1978-1997 range from 0:035 to 0:045. The treatment impacts
7I use a simple bootstrap procedure to construct the standard errors for the average treatment
e¤ect on the treated. I make 2,000 independent draws from the treatment and control observations
and form new estimates of the treatment e¤ect for each draw. The bootstrap standard error estimate
is the standard deviation of the 2000 new values for the estimated treatment e¤ect on the treated.
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Table 2.10: Average Treatment E¤ect on the Treated for rate of farmland loss and farmland
acres lost during 1978-1997: matched over full sample and restricted to within same time
period.
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Table 2.11: Average Treatment E¤ect on the Treated for rate of farmland loss and farmland
acres lost during 1949-1997: matched over full sample and restricted to within same time
period.
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for matching without restriction over full sample have a larger range (from  0:041 to
 0:045) than that for matching without restriction but within common support (from
 0:040 to  0:043). The estimated impacts for restricting matching to within time
period but without imposing common support restriction (from  0:041 to  0:043)
are larger than that for matching within common support (from  0:035 to  0:037).
These result indicates that imposing common support could eliminate bad matches.
However, the di¤erence in the results are not very large.
For the number of acres lost, the average treatment e¤ects on the treated of each
matching protocol during 1978-1997 range from  2013 to  2940 acres. This suggests
that counties with farmland preservation programs lost fewer acres per year, 403 fewer
acres on the low end and 600 fewer on the high end than similar counties without
farmland preservation programs. The average treatment e¤ects on the treated from
matching without restriction over full sample have a larger range (from  2789 to
 2940 acres) than that for matching within common support (from  2508 to  2752
acres). However, the within time period estimators over full sample are smaller (from
 2013 to  2077 acres) than that for within common support (from  2279 to  2284
acres).
The average treatment e¤ect on the treated from 1949-1997 are very similar to
those above. The average reduction in the rate of farmland loss of each matching
protocol from 1949 -1997 are the almost same as that from 1978-1997. The average
reduction in the acres of farmland loss has a slightly smaller range. The range is from
 2926 to  3039 for matching over full sample, and  2668 to  2695 for matching over
common support. The matching results for restricting matches within time period for
1949-1997 are exactly the same as that from 1978-1997 since counties start to have
active program after 1978.
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The similarity of the average treatment e¤ect on the treated from 1949-1997 to
that from 1978-1997 suggests that unobservable factors varying across time period
before 1982 do not have signicant impact on farmland loss. Given no county had a
preservation program with enrolled acreage before 1978, I had some concern about
not controlling for these unobservable factors in computing the propensity scores.
However, the estimated ATT for the observations before 1978 are very similar to those
matching over full sample as one might expect and those observations are assigned
very small weights in calculating counterfactuals.
The results suggest that the existence of a farmland preservation program in a
county reduces farmland loss by 3:5 to 4:5 percentage points on average, i.e. I nd
that equation (2.4) is satised. Given that the average rate of farmland loss per time
period is 7:35% in the full sample, this is a 48  61% change in the rate. The change
is an even larger percentage for the 1978-1997 sample, which has an average rate of
farmland loss of 3:4%. Similarly, in an absolute sense, acres converted reduced from
2; 013 to 3; 039 acres from an average acres converted of 10; 013 per period (20 30%).
2.7 Sensitivity Analysis and Robustness Check
The estimation results from a propensity score matching method show that the coun-
ties that have PDR programs have a statistically signicant lower rate and acres of
farmland loss than the counties that do not have such programs. The PSM method,
however, can be biased if there are unobservables remaining uncontrolled or the unob-
served factors have di¤erentiated impact on control and treated groups. To check the
impact of unobservables, I conduct sensitivity analysis and robustness check in this
section in three ways. First, I check the e¤ect of unobservables on the estimated ATTs
by calculating Rosenbaum bounds and hidden bias equivalents. Second, I estimate
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the average treatment e¤ect (ATE) estimator using the regression approach proposed
by Wooldridge (2002). Third, I employ two alternative ways to estimate the e¤ect
of PDR programs and control for the unobservables. One is a di¤erence-in-di¤erence
approach and the other is a two-stage regression approach with an inverse mills ratio
to control for the selection bias from unobservables.
2.7.1 Sensitivity analysis and hidden bias equivalents
The propensity score matching method potentially provides more reliable results than
a standard regression method by comparing control and treated observations that
are similar to each other, explicitly excluding outliers, and estimating the treatment
e¤ect on the treated non-parametrically. However, if there are unobserved variables
that a¤ect either the treatment assignment or the outcome variable di¤erently for
the treated and control groups, the CIA (CMI) condition does not hold and the
propensity score matching estimators are no longer consistent. While I controlled for
many observables, I also conducted a sensitivity analysis by looking at Rosenbaum
bounds and hidden bias equivalents (Rosenbaum, 2002; DiPrete and Gangl, 2004).8
Rosenbaum bounds is a signed rank test to assess the potential impact of hidden
bias arising from confounding variables associated with both treatment and outcome
variables. It assumes that the strength of the impacts from unobservable factors on
treatment selection and outcome is the same. This approach is relatively conservative
in the sense that it will nd bias even if the strength of unobservable factors on
8There are other strategies that assess the impact of hidden bias. An IV approach is proposed by
DiPrete and Gangl (2004) which is less conservative than Rosenbaum Bounds approach. Another
approach is proposed by Antoji and Elder (2000) which uses the bias estimated from the observ-
ables to calculate bias from unobservable variables. We use Rosenbaum Bounds as it is the most
appropriate approach for our problem.
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outcome is not as strong as the test assumes.
The estimated propensity score of a treated and control observation with identical
characteristics (the same covariates) should be equal if all the relevant covariates that
a¤ect both the treatment assignment and outcomes are included in the propensity
score model. The presence of unobserved covariates leads to discrepancies between the
propensity scores of treated and control observations with identical characteristics.
As a result, the odds ratio of a matched pair of treated and control observations based
on these characteristics will no longer be equal to one. The larger the e¤ect of an
unobserved covariate on the treatment assignment, the larger the di¤erence between
the odds ratio and one will be.
Rosenbaum had shown that the odds ratio for matched pairs is bounded by the
function of the strength of the e¤ect. Therefore, a signed rank statistic of each
strength level has its upper and lower bounds and their corresponding p-values. One
can determine a critical level of the strength for a 95% condence interval. If the un-
observed covariates a¤ect the treatment assignment and/or the outcome at a strength
level greater than the critical e¤ect strength level, the average treatment e¤ects could
include zero.9
Beyond nding the upper and lower bounds, following DiPrete and Gangl (2004),
I also calculate the hidden bias equivalents on some key covariates. Table 2.12 re-
ports the upper and lower bounds for Kernel matching with Epan kernel type with
bandwidth=0:02 for matching without restriction as well as the hidden bias equiva-
lents.10 The threshold gamma measures the e¤ect strength of unobservable variables
9See Rosenbaum (2002) and DiPrete and Gangl(2004) for more information.
10Given that fact the Rosenbaum bounds approach does not deal with stratied or cluster samples,
I am not able to conduct a sensitivity analysis for matching within time periods.
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on treatment assignment and equals 1:92 for the rate of farmland loss. Thus the
statistical signicance of the ATT for the rate of farmland loss is called into question
when the odds ratio of treatment assignment between the treated and control groups
di¤ers by more than 1:92. However, while questionable, the treatment e¤ect can still
be signicant if the e¤ect on the treatment assignment is greater than the e¤ect on
the outcome.
I calculate the hidden bias equivalents on three key variables. The total acres of
farmland in a county, net agricultural prot per acre and median family income. At
the critical level of gamma for the rate of farmland loss, in terms of a¤ecting the
ATT results, the possible unobserved variables would have to have the same impact
as changing these 3 key variables by 31; 000 acres (22%) for total acres of farmland,
by $800 (36%) for net agricultural prot per acres, and by $5810 (10%) for median
housing value. For farmland acres loss, the critical threshold gamma is 1:72. The
hidden bias equivalents are a change of 24; 000 acres (17%) in total farmland, $600
(29%) in net agricultural prot per acre, and $4710 (8%) in median housing value.
These hidden bias equivalents suggest the ATT results are not largely sensitive to
changes in key variables or potential unobserved variables.
2.7.2 Regression estimation and average treatment e¤ect
While the ATT e¤ect that I have estimated is signicant, it cannot be generalized
to the entire population due to self-selection. An Average Treatment E¤ect (ATE)
is an expected e¤ect of treatment on a randomly selected county (Wooldridge, 2002)
but it requires more restrictive assumptions. To check how general my estimators
are and how well my estimation of ATT addresses the self-selection issue, I estimate








































































This approach is to include as regressors the treatment indictor, estimated propensity
score, a set of variables that a¤ect outcomes. The estimated propensity score should
control all the information in the covariates that is relevant to estimate the treatment
e¤ect.
I specify a random e¤ect model controlling for the treatment, estimated propen-
sity score, and a set of control variables that impact farmland loss. The control
factors in the random e¤ect model include: acres of farmland and its square (possible
non-linear impacts), metropolitan status, percentage change in total housing units,
median housing value, population per acre, net agricultural prot per acre, and per-
cent of operator with any o¤-farm work, median family income, and percentage of the
population with high school education. Controls for time e¤ects include time dum-
mies indicating the time periods after 1978. I estimate the random e¤ect regression
for both the full sample and a post-1978 sub-sample. I do not remove outliers or
those not on the common support in this exercise (Table 2.13).
For the rate of farmland loss, the estimated coe¢ cient for the treatment indictor is
 0:022 for the full sample compared to the ATTs of  0:034 to 0:040. The coe¢ cient
is  0:015 for the regression over the post-1978 sub-sample compared to the ATTs of
 0:035 to  0:045. The estimated coe¢ cient on the treatment indicator for acres of
farmland lost is insignicant for full sample (ATTs range from  2; 013 to  3; 039)
but signicant for the post-1978 sub-sample. The estimated coe¢ cient is  1; 487 for
post-1978 sub-sample compared to  2; 013 to  2; 284.
On a whole, my results under both approaches are signicant and similar. I
therefore can conclude the my estimation can be generalized to the whole population
and the self-selection issue is well addressed.
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Table 2.13: Average Treatment E¤ect (ATE) estimation.
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2.7.3 Di¤erence-in-di¤erence model and two-stage regression
To further check the robustness of the results, I employ two more approaches with
di¤erent assumptions on the structures of unobservables to estimate the e¤ect of
PDR programs on farmland loss. The rst approach is a xed e¤ect or a di¤erence-
in-di¤erence model. A xed e¤ect regression assumes that both unobservables and
the e¤ect of the unobservables on farmland loss are constant over time. The xed
e¤ect regression returns a consistent estimation even if unobserved xed e¤ects are
correlated with program establishment. I control for both county and time e¤ects
in this regression. The second approach is a two-stage regression. The rst stage
regression is a Logit or a Probit regression of PDR establishment in a county and
the second stage regression is an OLS regression of farmland loss. This approach
assumes that the error terms in the program establishment equation and the farmland
loss equation are jointly normally distributed. The rst stage regression predicts an
Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR) and the IMR is used as a regressor in the second stage
OLS regression to control for possible selections of a county having a PDR program.
The estimation from the two-stage regression is consistent as long as the error terms
are truly jointly normally distributed. This regression would require one to correct
for heteroskedasticity introduced by the IMR.
For the purpose of result comparison, I also run an OLS regression without control-
ling any unobservables. Table 2.14 presents the results for the sub-sample of 1978-1997
for both the rate of farmland loss and the acres of farmland lost. The regressors for all
the regressions in the table are the same as those in the random e¤ect logit regression
to estimate propensity scores. I use a di¤erent set of variables to predict the Inverse
Mills Ratio. The variables include: acres of harvested farmland, percentage change
in housing value, percentage change in median family income, percentage change in
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population, met indicator, number of farms, percentage labors in agricultural sec-
tor, percentage of operators with more than 100 days o¤-farm work, net agricultural
prot per acre, percentage population with high school education, their squared and
interactions terms.
All regression return a negative sign for the indicator of a county having a PDR
program. The estimators for most of the regressions are smaller than the estimated
ATTs but similar to the ATEs for both the rate of farmland loss and acres lost.
2.8 Conclusion
Few studies have found that farmland preservation programs are having an impact on
farmland loss. If a high rate of farmland loss is the reason that a county implements a
program, one must take into account the identication problem that this simultaneity
generates. Using the propensity score matching method to compare farmland loss
among counties with and without farmland preservation programs having similar
characteristics, this analysis nds that farmland preservation programs have reduced
farmland loss.
This specication includes key variables that a¤ect both farmland loss and the
existence of farmland preservation program. The standardized di¤erence test and
balancing in a regression framework suggest that the average treatment e¤ects on the
treated are estimated using treatment and control groups that have similar charac-
teristics on most variables of interest.
The conclusion appears robust that agricultural preservation programs reduce the
rate of farmland loss by about 3:5   4:5 percentage points for each time period for
the Mid-Atlantic area. I have accounted for the key variables needed to explain the
existence of farmland preservation programs and farmland loss. Sensitivity analysis
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Table 2.14: The e¤ect of PDR programs on the rate of farmland loss from a Di¤erence-in-
Di¤erence model, an OLS regression, and a two-stage regression.
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suggests that key characteristics that a¤ect farmland loss would have to change a
great deal (10  35%) to call into question the results.
My estimate is the average impact on the treated; i.e. the impact on counties with
farmland preservation program. Given that counties may have di¤erent underlying
causes for their farmland loss, for example, some counties in the analysis lost farm-
land because they lost population rather than because the land was being converted to
housing, the results do not suggest that instituting a farmland preservation program
may arrest farmland loss in all areas. Some farmland could have been converted to
forest, tourism or recreational uses rather than residential or commercial uses. How-
ever, most counties with preservation programs were losing farmland to residential
and commercial uses, thus irreversibly. Unfortunately, county-level data precludes me
from knowing more about the spatial distribution or fragmentation of the remaining
farmland which may have an impact on the pattern of suburban development, the
open-space amenities, and the long-run viability of the agricultural sector.
Further research into the impact and the underlying reasons why these programs
may impact farmland loss is important. It will be interesting to study whether farm-
land preservation programs shift developers to convert forest land at an increased
level, i.e. whether the net loss of open space holds constant, or increases the density
of housing on the farmland that continues to be converted.
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Chapter 3
Evaluate the e¤ect of Designated Preservation
Areas on Agricultural Land Preservation
3.1 Introduction
Concerns about farmland loss and suburban sprawl motivated 128 state and local
government entities to institute preservation programs and preserve 938.28 million
acres at an overall cost of $4.467 billion (American Farmland Trust 2007a, 2007b).
As mentioned above, farmland preservation programs are justied on various grounds
including e¢ cient development of urban and rural land, local and national food se-
curity, viability of the local agricultural economy, and the protection of rural and
environmental amenities (Gardner, 1977; Hellerstein et al., 2002). Nickerson and
Hellerstein (2003) found that PDR programs prioritize productivity (high soil quality
for agricultural uses) and preserving large blocks of land. Critics suggest these pro-
grams do not lead to e¢ cient development or limit land conversion, do not maximize
social benets by preserving the most productive farms, and do not prevent land frag-
mentation by preserving large blocks of land (Pfe¤er and Lapping 1996, Daniels and
Lapping 2001, Lynch and Musser 2001). The agricultural preservation programs have
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retained land in a scatter gun pattern rather than targeting specic geographic re-
gions. Concentrated preservation in targeted preservation areas may aid in achieving
the goals, decreasing both fragmentation and land conversion. The targeting e¤ort
may provide greater social benets and help retain a viable agricultural economy if
threshold impacts or economies of scale exist. For example, a critical mass of con-
tiguous farms may be needed due to economies of scale in supporting industries and
to avoid conicts with non-farm neighbors (Lynch and Carpenter 2003). Ecological
benets will also increase if large blocks of undeveloped land are needed for ecosystem
services provision such as wildlife habitat and water quality.
Although Maryland has a plethora of land preservation programs, contiguity of
preserved parcels has not been achieved (Lynch and Musser 2003). In particular,
the Maryland Agricultural Land Preservation Foundation (MALPF) used a ranking
scheme under which contiguity received no value. In an e¤ort to address this lim-
itation, Maryland introduced the Rural Legacy (RL) program in 1997 under which
contiguity is deemed very important. The cornerstone of the RL program is to desig-
nate RL Areas. Local governments or private land conservation organizations select
the most desirable lands to be preserved. Once designated, sponsors receive special
funding from the state to preserve farm, forest, and ecologically important resource
lands in a contiguous fashion within these areas. Continuous fundings are provided
until all of the parcels in designated RL areas are preserved with RL program or other
conservation programs.
In this chapter, I evaluate the e¤ect of RL program on agricultural land preser-
vation using a parcel level data for 3 Southern Maryland counties: Calvert, Charles,
and St. Marys. Specically, I study whether RL funding signicantly increases land
preservation in RL areas compared to non-RL areas. The preservation is measured
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by two outcome variables: the likelihood and acres of preservation. The likelihood
of preservation is a discrete variable with its realized value as 1 if a parcel is pre-
served and 0 otherwise. The acres of preservation is measured as the acres of a parcel
weighted by the likelihood of preservation.
I use a propensity score matching method as in Chapter 2 to evaluate the e¤ect.
Parcels out of RL areas with similar observed attributes are matched to the parcels
in RL areas to construct counterfactuals. The di¤erence in the outcomes between
the RL parcels (refers to parcels in RL areas) and their constructed counterfactuals,
however, cannot be credited solely as the e¤ect of RL program.
Two issues are responsible for this. The rst is a predisposition e¤ect: the parcels
in RL areas are predisposed to be preserved if they are more attractive to agricultural
preservation programs due to attributes unobserved by researchers. The selected
lands for RL areas designation may be desirable not only to RL program, but also
to the other existing farmland preservation programs. If this is the case, the RL
parcels are more likely to be preserved by existing non-RL programs even after the
RL program was introduced. The di¤erence in the outcomes between RL parcels
and their constructed counterfactuals includes both the e¤ect of RL program and the
predisposition e¤ect.
The second, which is more of problem, is a crowding e¤ect of RL program on
the existing conservation programs. The special funding should result in a higher
probability or more acres of preservation in RL areas but also might interact with the
existing preservation programs. Several possible interactions may occur. If the RL ar-
eas are the most desirable lands to preserve, the designation and extra funding could
increase the preservation e¤ort within the area and therefore result in even higher
probability of preservation and more preserved acres. For example, if economies of
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scale or threshold impacts exist and contiguity increases the marginal benets of each
acres preserved, both RL and the other programs could receive higher benets from
each additional acre preserved in the RL areas relative to a non-RL parcel (refers to
the parcels out of RL areas). This would be an example of crowding in preservation.
The increase in marginal benets makes preservation there higher valued. However,
the RL programs e¤orts can also crowd out other programspreservation from the
designated area. If the programs compete for the same land, the cost of preserva-
tion per acre could increase within the RL areas, e.g. the landownersasking price
increases. Therefore, the other programs may select parcels outside the RL areas to
enroll more acres.
I evaluate the e¤ect of RL areas designation by taking into account the predispo-
sition e¤ect and crowding e¤ect in this chapter. I rst estimate the average treatment
e¤ect of the RL program on the parcels in RL areas assuming that there is not such
e¤ects. Second, I use a di¤erence-in-di¤erence approach to control for the predisposi-
tion e¤ect. Third, I proposed complex matching methods to isolate the predisposition
e¤ect, crowding e¤ect and the net e¤ect of RL program.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 provides the
background information of RL program and my study areas, and the description
of data source is in Section 3.3. A Naive e¤ect assuming no predisposition and
crowding e¤ects is estimated in Section 3.4. A di¤erence-in-di¤erence propensity score
matching model that controls for the predisposition e¤ect is presented in Section 3.5.
Section 3.6 is a discussion of the crowding e¤ect and strategies to isolate the crowding
e¤ect, and the net e¤ect of RL program. I then conclude in Section 3.7.
56
3.2 Background
3.2.1 Rural Legacy program
The Rural Legacy Program was created by the 1997 Maryland General Assembly as
a major element of the Smart Growth and Neighborhood Conservation initiative. Its
mission is to reduce the rate of land conversion to protect areas rich in farms, forests,
and natural and cultural resources. The goals of Rural Legacy are 1) to establish
greenbelts of forests and farms around rural communities to preserve their cultural
heritage and sense of place; 2) preserve critical habitat for native plant and wildlife
species; 3) support natural resource-based economies like farming, forestry, tourism,
and outdoor recreation; and, 4) protect riparian forests, wetlands, and greenways to
bu¤er the Chesapeake Bay and its tributaries from pollution run-o¤. From 1998 to
February 2007, 30 RL areas have been approved (Figure 3.1) in Maryland.
The Rural Legacy (RL) Program requires contiguous tracts of resource land to
be identied for preservation and provides extra funding for these areas. It aims to
protect 200; 000 acres by 2022. At least $5:0 million of the annual state capital budget
must be directed to the RL program. From 1997 to April 2008, the RL program has
provided $163 millions to local groups to preserve 58; 217 acres of farmland, forests,
and natural areas in Maryland.
Funding for RL acquisitions is through the State Rural Legacy Grant Program.
Each year the Maryland legislature and the Governor determine the annual budget
for the RL program. The 11-member Rural Legacy Advisory Committee and the
Rural Legacy board, which is comprised of Marylands Agriculture, Natural Resources
and Planning Secretatries, review grant applications annually. The grant application

























based on fund availability. If local groups or counties has not preserved land with
the money allocated to them, the RL grants can be taken back by the state and
reallocated to other RL areas. For example, $82 millions have been rewarded to RL
areas by Fiscal Year 2001. Only $38:3, or roughly 47% of the money has been used
to preserve land. The rest was recaptured and reallocated in the following years.
Governments and experienced land trusts/nonprots may establish priority preser-
vation areas that are eligible for RL preservation funds. RL Areas designation are
prioritized based on the agricultural, forestry, natural and historical and cultural re-
sources protected, the level of conversion pressure, and the economic value of the
areas resource-based industries or services. The RL programs have focused on areas
with agricultural, forestry, and ecological benecial land-uses. Landowners in the
designated RL program areas can sell or donate their development rights and retain
ownership of their land. The RL program also permits purchases of the land outright
for public use.
Unlike the Maryland Agricultural Land Preservation Foundation (MALPF)s farm-
land protection program, Rural Legacy program does not have specic minimum re-
quirements for soil qualities nor is it restricted to farm and forested land. Instead, the
program focuses on land with multiple conservation values that may not be considered
by other programs. The program allows greater exibility in evaluating such prop-
erties and developing the appropriate easements. If a small parcel has extraordinary
agricultural, environmental, or historic features on the property, the RL program will
consider it for preservation as well.
Many RL sponsors use an Easement Valuation System (EVS) to set the value to
be paid for a conservation easement. The EVS uses appraisals and a point system
for natural resources. The EVS sets a base easement value as 50 percent of the most
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recent MALPF appraisals and adds value by assigning points to soil quality, biological
importance, and priority preservation status and multiplying the total points by a
price factor. The total easement payment for a parcel, however, is capped at 80% of
the appraisal value from MALPF. The point-based payments reward ecological and
other attributes such as large parcels, wetlands, endangered species and other wildlife
habitat, and swamps, which are often discounted in an appraisal approach.
3.2.2 The Rural Legacy areas in Southern Maryland
Charles, Calvert, and St. Marys counties in Maryland comprise what is known
as Southern Maryland. Its eastern boundary is the Chesapeake Bay and western
boundary is the Potomac River. Patuxent River separates Calvert from St. Marys
County. Both the Potomac and the Patuxent Rivers ow into the Chesapeake Bay.
The area is within 2 hours of both Washington, D.C. and Baltimore, MD. It has
experienced high population growth that outpaced both Marylands growth rate and
the countrys growth rate in late 1990s due to job opportunity from the U.S. Navys
installations and a¢ liated high-tech defense contractors.
All three counties designated Rural Legacy areas soon after the program began to
protect their watersheds from development and to protect the most ecologically valu-
able properties (Table 3.1). Southern Maryland has ve approved RL areas for a total
of 84; 102 acres: Calvert Creeks and North Calvert in Calvert County, Huntersville
and Mattapany in St. Marys County, and Zekiah Watershed in Charles County.
North Calvert area was approved in 2004, Mattapany in 2006, and the other three in
1998. This dissertation uses the RL areas designated in 1998.
The Calvert Creeks RL area (20; 527 acres) seeks to protect water quality and
wetland habitat as well as cultural resources. The Huntersville RL area (8; 357 acres)
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Table 3.1: Available grants for the Rural Legacy Areas in Calver, Charles and St. Marys
Counties
includes shoreline with signicant agricultural, forestry, and environmental values in-
cluding endangered species habitat, wetlands, historic structures and archeological
sites. The Smithsonian Center for Natural Areas has designated part of this RL
area as critical wildlife habitat in need of protection. The Zekiah Watershed RL area
(31; 000 acres) protects farms, forests, Special State wetlands, historic and archeologi-
cal sites, and deposits rich in mineral aggregates. The Smithsonian Institute considers
its natural hardwood swamp to be one of the most important ecological areas on the
East Coast. The boundaries of the Zekiah Watershed RL area follow, for the most
part, the boundaries of the watershed itself and major road feature. The Zekiah Wa-
tershed RL sponsors decided to concentrate on the area with the most development
pressure rst. The other later areas include Mattapany and North Calvert. Matta-
pany RL area (13; 703 acres) protects rich farmland, forests, wetlands, historic sites
and wildlife habitat, and provides water quality benets. The North Calvert RL area
(10; 515 acres) forms an 8-mile long greenway along the Patuxent River with riparian
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bu¤ers: protecting the sensitive wetlands as well as farmland, forest land and wildlife
habitat.
Three of the ve RL areas are used in this analysis: Calvert Creeks, Huntersville,
and Zekiah areas. The other two did not have data available because they were only
recently approved. By 2006, the RL program has protected 1; 660 acres at a cost
of $6:8 million with an average price of $4; 003 per acre in Calvert Creeks RL area.
In the Huntersville RL area the RL program has preserved 2; 720 acres at a cost of
$8:8 million; average cost was $2; 693 per acre. The Zekiah Watershed RL area has
preserved 2; 328 acres at a cost of $9:4 million and at an average cost of $3; 866 per
acre under RL program.
3.2.3 Other preservation programs in Maryland
Established 1977, the MALPF aims to preserve productive farmland and woodland
as open space permanently and curb the expansion of random urban development.
By 2007, over 265; 691 acres are protected by about $490 millions (Table 3.2). The
program has protected 4; 263 acres in Calvert, 5; 872 in St. Marys, and 3; 474 in
Charles by 2005. Payments were $5; 291 per acre in Calvert in 2004, $2; 937 in St.
Marys, and $3; 474 in Charles in 2005.
Districted parcels are eligible for participating MALPF. The maximum price that
MALPF will pay is the lower of a landowners asking price or the calculated ease-
ment value. A propertys easement value is determined by subtracting its computed
agricultural value from its fair market value. The fair market value of land (that
which a developer might pay) is determined by at least two independent fee apprais-
ers. Agricultural value of a parcel is calculated by the MALPF. The agricultural
production value is determined by a formula that calculates land rent based on the
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soil productivity or the ve-year average cash rent in the county.
Although MALPF has agreed to co-hold easement with the RL program in certain
areas, this only reduces on-going monitor expenses for RL program rather than sharing
easement acquisition costs for preservation. No co-held easements were identied in
Southern Maryland.
Transfer of development rights (TDR) programs is also available in all three coun-
ties. A TDR program allows landowners in one area to sell the development rights
associated with their property to developers who use them to develop other land
more intensively than permitted by baseline zoning. Development right are trans-
ferred from an agricultural area and farmland is preserved; development occurs in
the designated growth zones. By 2004, Calvert has protected almost 13; 000 acres
through its TDR program; St. Marys has 221 acres, and Charles has 1; 554 acres.
Calvert county also bought TDRs from landowners and retired them in its Leveraging
and Retirement Fund (LAR) and Purchase and Retirement Fund (PAR).
Maryland Environmental Trust (MET) aims to protect land from development
through donated conservation easements. By 2006, MET has preserved 106; 007 acres
state-wide. By 2003, the acres preserved by MET in Calvert County is 2089, 4934 in
Charles, and 3; 248 in St. Marys.
Almost 30 percent of the RL areas have been preserved compared to only 5:6% of
the non-RL areas - suggesting that these areas are predisposed to be preserved. Figure
3.2 delineates the RL areas and the level of preservation under the di¤erent programs
geographically. Since 1997, signicant preservation activity has occurred from all
the preservation programs. Rural Legacy program has preserved almost 6; 500 acres
in these 3 counties since 1997. The MALPF program has preserved almost half of








































































Figure 3.2: Rural Legacy Areas and preserved parcels by program type
40% of their acres since 1997. At rst glance, the raw data suggest a crowding out
phenomena: the TDR programs had preserved 42% of its acreage within the RL areas
pre-1997; but after 1997, the TDR program preserved only 30%. Similarly, MALPF
preserved 28% of its acreage in RL areas before designation but only 4:5% after 1997.
3.3 Data Sources and Parcel Attributes
Data was collected on agricultural and forest parcels greater than 3 acres in 3 Mary-
land counties. I collected information on variables that a¤ect RL areas designation
65
and preservation outcomes.
The primary data set, the MDPropertyView 2002 Database, provided parcel level
information such as parcel size, zoning density, waterfront access, public sewer avail-
ability, housing construction, subdivision designation, parcel valuation, transaction,
and geographic coordinates. The MDPropertyView 2002 Database (MDPVD) is cre-
ated by the Maryland Department of Planning (MDP) as a series of county-level les.
The les include data updated through October 2003 from the States Department
of Assessments and Taxation. The les are spatially referenced for use in GIS, al-
lowing the data to be utilized in conjunction with other state and federal spatially
referenced data sets. The parcels are spatially referenced by the x and y coordi-
nates in NAD83 meters Maryland State Plane Coordinate System. Each parcel is
also identied by a unique account number that allows parcel-level links between the
various MdPropertyView 2002 data les and parcel-level data sets created by other
State agencies. For each parcel, data were collected from MDPropertyView on the
most current transfer date, price paid for the entire parcel at last transfer date, how
the parcel was conveyed (arms-length or non arms-length), whether it was part of
a multi-parcel sale, number of acres in the parcel, waterfront area for those counties
near the Atlantic Ocean, Chesapeake Bay or major tributaries, the assessed value of
the land, the assessed value of all improvements, and the total assessed value.
A wealth of data characterizing Maryland lands is linked to the MDPVD land
parcels spatially through GIS techniques. For the most part, the land characteristics
data is stored in maps that have been digitized by the State of Maryland. To extract
this data for the specic land parcels in the MDPVD, bu¤er parcels are created as
proxies for the true parcel boundaries.1 A bu¤er parcel is a circular area whose center
1Exact land parcel boundaries are preferred to bu¤er parcels, but are currently available only for
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is at the land parcel centroid and whose total area is equal to the land parcels acreage.
TheMDPVD contains the exact location of each parcel centroid as spatially referenced
x and y coordinates. ArcView 3.2 GIS software uses these x and y coordinates
to map the parcel centroids across Maryland. Each land parcels size in acres, as
measured in MDPVD, is used to calculate the parcels radius in meters according to
the formula: radius = [(acres  4046:87) =3:1416]1=2. With the radius and the parcel
centroid for each land parcel, the Bu¤er Selected Feature command in ArcView creates
noncontiguous circular bu¤er parcels. These bu¤er parcels intersect with spatially
referenced data to extract land characteristics for the MDPVD land parcels. This
process is called bu¤er parcel extraction.
Land use information for 1997 were extracted and the percentage of each type
of land use were computed for each parcel. Land uses are categorized into Urban
Areas, Agriculture, Forest, Water, Wetlands, and Barren Land. Urban Areas includes
the sub-categories low-density residential, medium-density residential, high-density
residential, commercial, industrial, institutional, extractive, and open urban land
uses. Agriculture includes cropland, pasture, orchards, vineyards, and agricultural
buildings and storage. Forest includes deciduous, evergreen, and mixed forests as
well as brush. Water and Wetlands refer to open water and intermittently wet areas,
respectively. Finally, Barren Land includes beaches, bare rock, and bare ground.
ArcView is used to extract the land use data for each bu¤er parcel as the percentage
of the parcel in each land use category. These land uses sum to 100 percent.
Soil data comes from the Maryland Department of State Plannings 1973 work
to classify and map all Maryland soils, completed in conjunction with the U.S. De-
partment of Agriculture Soil Conservation Service. The two agencies developed the
Montgomery and Howard County, Maryland.
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Natural Soil Groups classication system. Soils are grouped by productivity, erosion
potential, permeability, stoniness and rockiness, depth to bedrock, depth to water ta-
ble, slope, stability, and susceptibility to ooding. The MDP denes these factors as
most signicant for land use planning purposes. The Natural Soil Groups Technical
Report (Maryland Department of State Planning, 1973) provides estimated chemical
and physical properties for each soil group. Each soil group is classied according to
categories for each of several soil properties. ArcView is used to extract the natural
soil groups present on each parcel as the percentage of the parcel in each soil category.
The categories dene soil slope, soil erodibility, and oodplain soils, which a¤ect the
extent of potential development on the land and agricultural returns.
Distance to Washington, D.C. in miles was computed using U.S. Census Bureau
road networks. For the ecological values of each parcel, I computed the percent of
Marylands Sensitive Species Project Review Areas, which include rare, threatened,
and endangered species and rare natural community types (Maryland DNR 2003),
and Non-tidal Wetlands of Special State Concern (Department of the Environment
and DNR 1998). The percent of the parcel in estuarine wetland status was also
extracted from the Maryland Wetland Map (Maryland DNR 1998).
Preservation data was collected from the state-wide preservation programMALPF
parcels through 2005, from the Maryland Environmental Trust through 2004, from
the Calvert Transfer of Development Rights program through 2004, and from private
conservation groups (Nature conservancy, private land trusts) through 2005. Mary-
land DNR provided information on RL areas designation and approved landowners
who were matched to specic parcels. The number of preserved acres within a 1 mile
radius was also extracted for each parcel.
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3.4 NaiveAverage Treatment E¤ect on the Treat-
ment
I estimate an average treatment e¤ect on the treated in this section assuming that
there is no predisposition e¤ect and crowding e¤ect. As mentioned in the Section 3.1, I
use two outcome variables to approximate the e¤ect of the land preservation programs:
1) the probability that a parcel is preserved, and 2) the acres that are preserved. The
realized probability of preservation is either 0 (a parcel is not preserved) or 1 (a parcel
is preserved). The unobserved probabilities (constructed counterfactuals), however
can take any value between 0 and 1. The preserved acres is the acres of a parcel
weighted by the probability that the parcel is preserved. The treatment variable is
whether a parcel is in a RL area or not: 1 indicates the parcel is in a RL area, and
0 otherwise. The fundamental question is: does targeting or delineating the most
desirable parcels to preserve have any impact on the preservation within that area.
The e¤ect of RL program designation on land preservation is estimated by match-
ing the agricultural parcels in RL areas with those most similar parcels outside the RL
areas. Assuming that a conditional mean independence assumption holds, I can match
the non-RL parcels (control parcels) to the parcels in RL areas (treated parcels). The
matched control parcels can then be used to construct counterfactuals for the parcels
that are in the RL areas. I then calculate the Average Treatment E¤ect on the




Assign the outcome variable of the RL program as Yi for parcel i. The observed out-
come depends on a set of exogenous variables Xi, and a dummy variable representing
treatment status RLi. The outcome equations for a parcel in its two treatment status
can be written as:
Y 0i = g(Xi) + U
0
i (3.1)
Y 1i = g(Xi) + i(Xi) + U
1
i (3.2)
Y 1i is the outcome when RLi = 1 and Y
0
i otherwise. Ui is a random error term.
The "naive" e¤ect of the RL program can be expressed as:
ERL = E (ijXi; RLi = 1) = E
 
Y 1i   Y 0i jRLi = 1

This e¤ect is the di¤erence in the outcome between the treated parcels and their
unobserved counterfactuals. The unobserved counterfactual is constructed using a
propensity score matching method.
3.4.2 Propensity score estimation and matching methods
Propensity scores are estimated with a Logit model. I include in the model all the
key covariates that a¤ect both a parcels inclusion in RL areas and pre-treatment out-
comes. I specify the Logit model to provide the best prediction of a Rural Legacy area
designation. These parcel-level variables include proxies for ecological, agricultural,
and forestry values, and development pressure.
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The parcels that are waterfront properties, have a high percent of estuarine areas
and wetland, have a higher percent of a oodplain, have a high percentage of special
habitat, and land-uses of cropland and pasture, are of high ecological and agricultural
value and more likely to be included in a RL area. The parcels that are on public
sewer or with zoning densities permitting more houses per acres, however, are less
likely to be included in RL areas as RL program also aims to slow down conversion.
Solid quality indicators such as, distance to bed rock, permeability, and erodeability
are also included as the RL program values those attributes. Table 3.3 reports the
estimated coe¢ cients for predicting a parcels inclusion in a RL area.
Figure 3.3 is the distribution of estimated propensity scores for treated and control
parcels. The distributions are not very compatible, with control being more left-
skewed. I therefore use a leave-one-out cross-validation criterion to choose matching
method. Two matching methods that perform better than others are selected to
conduct matchings. The two matching techniques are: Kernel matching with normal
kernel and bandwidth 0:01, and local linear matching method with biweight kernel
and bandwidth 0:1.
3.4.3 Balancing test and matching results
I use only the parcels greater than 10 acres for matching since these are the ones most
likely to be preserved. The parcels that are preserved before RL program was intro-
duced are dropped. Balancing tests are conducted using the standardized di¤erence
test, a t-test for equality of the variable means in the matched treated and control
groups. For the preservation outcomes, I nd that the treatment and control groups
(10+ acres) have equal means except for the permeability and erodeability variables
for all matching protocols. The mean permeability for treated and control groups are
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Table 3.3: Estimated coe¢ cient for the propensity score logistic regression
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Figure 3.3: Distribution of estimated propensity scores
63% and 54%, for mean erodeability are 20% and 16%. Theoretically, parcels with
higher permeability levels and low erodeability would be more likely to be developed
rather than preserved. The failure of balance test for the variables permeability and
erodeability may induce a downward biased estimator for the impact of RL program.
The matching results in Table 3.4 show that the parcels in RL areas have a 10:1
percentage points higher probability of being preserved than the parcels out of RL
areas. On average, 11 more acres are preserved in RL areas than out of RL areas.
This estimated average treatment e¤ect on the treatment, however, cannot be claimed
to be the net e¤ect of RL program if the parcels in RL areas are predisposed to be
preserved.
3.5 Predisposition E¤ect
The matching methods in the Section 3.4 may take account of some but not all of
the selection bias. As a result, part of the di¤erence between the matched treated
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Table 3.4: The e¤ect of RL program on land preservation assuming no predisposition e¤ect
and crowding e¤ect
and control parcels may be due to unobserved parcel attributes rather than the RL
program. I use a di¤erence-in-di¤erence (DID) approach to control for the potential
predisposition e¤ect in this section. I rst match the control to the treated parcels
in the same way as in the previous section. Second, I take the di¤erence in the
pre-treatment and post-treatment outcomes for each matched parcel. Last, I take
the di¤erence of the di¤erence between matched treated and control parcels for the
di¤erence-in-di¤erence estimator.
3.5.1 Empirical illustration
To illustrate the DID approach, I assign Yit as the outcome for a parcel i at time t.
t = ft0; t1g indicates a pre- or post-treatment period. The outcome depends on a set
of exogenous variables Xi, and a dummy variable representing treatment status RLit.
RL1it0 = 0, and RL
1
it1




for parcels in non-RL areas. The outcome equations for a parcel in its two treatment
status can be written as:




Y 1it = gt(Xi) + it(Xi) RL1it + U1it (3.4)
Uit is the error term and Uit = i + "it. Uit can be decomposed to an individual
specic xed e¤ect i, and a temporary individual-specic e¤ect "it. The individ-
ual xed e¤ect, i, is an unobserved parcel attribute that a¤ect the likelihood of
preservation. The selection into the treatment state is independent of "it.
The direct e¤ect of the RL program on the outcome is:
ERL = E
 
itjXi; RL1it = 1

The e¤ect of unobservables i:
E = E
 
ijXi; RL1it = 1

The direct e¤ect of the RL program on the outcome, ERL, can be estimated by
the following DID estimator:
ATTDID = E((Y 1it1   Y
1
it0
)jRL1it = 1)  E((Y 0it1   Y
0
it0
)jRL0it = 0; P (Xi))
3.5.2 Pre- and Post-treatment outcomes
My data allows me to trace back the preservation status of the parcels before the RL
program was introduced in 1997. I assign the pre-treatment probability of preserva-
tion as 0 for the parcels that are preserved after 1997.
Parcels are enrolled in preservation programs at di¤erent points of time. For
example, a parcel that is protected after a RL area is designated can be preserved in
any year after the year of designation, and the same holds for a parcel being preserved
before the RL areas were designated. In order to impose the same time frame for pre-
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and post-treatment groups, I drop all the parcels with their enrollment year falling
outside the relevant time period. For example, I drop the parcels that are preserved
before 1989 such that the protected parcels are preserved in a 9-year period for both
pre- and post-treatment groups.
The mean preservation rate and acres before matching is reported in Table 3.5.
Overall, parcels are more likely to be preserved and more acres are preserved in post-
treatment period in both RL and non-RL areas. However, more acres and a larger
proportion of parcels are preserved within RL areas than outside RL areas in both
pre- and post-treatment periods. Non-RL programs have preserved 2:48 more acres
and 4:6 more percentage points in RL areas than outside RL areas in pre-treatment
period. After RL program was introduced, the di¤erences in preservation rate and
preserved acres are even larger: the di¤erence in acres increases to 13:5 and the rate
of preservation to 18 percentage points. Even after excluding the parcels preserved
by the RL program, parcels in RL areas still have a 13:4 percentage points higher
rate of preservation and 5:33 more acres being preserved.
3.5.3 Result from a di¤erence-in-di¤erence approach
Table 3.6 presents the average treatment e¤ect on the treated from the di¤erence-
in-di¤erence approach. After controlling for the predisposition e¤ect, the parcels in
RL areas still have a 9:4 percentage points higher probability of being preserved, and
have 10:2 more acres on average being preserved. This estimated average treatment
e¤ect on the treated, however, still cannot be claimed to be the net impact of RL
program. The reason is that the DID approach is based on the assumption that
selection bias due to unobserved parcel attribute is time-invariant conditional on
observed covariates. However, there may exist time e¤ect that bias the estimation,
76
Table 3.5: Rate of preservation and acres preserved in RL and non-RL areas before and
after 1997
e.g. dramatic changes in development pressure or budget for non-RL programs.2
Besides a time e¤ect, RL program may also interact with non-RL programs and
a¤ect their preservation e¤orts in RL areas. Hence, the estimated ATT also includes
a crowding e¤ect. If there is a crowding out e¤ect, more parcels outside the RL areas
are preserved than would have been if the RL program was not introduced. Therefore,
the estimated ATT would be smaller than the direct impact of the RL program. If the
RL program crowds in the preservation e¤orts of the other programs, the estimated
ATT would be larger than the direct impact.
2The reduction in non-RL budget would be a result of crowding out e¤ect if the operators of non-
RL programs do so after abserving the increment of RL funds. Budge cuts due to a bad economic
situtation, however, cannot be attributed to a crowding out e¤ect.
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Table 3.6: The estimated e¤ect of RL program on preservation from a di¤erence-in-di¤erence
approach
3.6 Crowding E¤ect
Crowding e¤ects have been studied by the researchers in various elds. Ahmed and
Miller (2000) examine whether tax-nanced or debt-nanced government spendings
crowd out or crowd in private investment. Andreoni and Bergstrom (1996) examine
whether tax-nanced government subsidies crowd in or crowd out voluntary private
contributions to nance public goods - are people more likely to contribute to public
goods when governments subsidize the cost. Brooks (2005), Andreoni and Payne
(2003), and Andreoni (1993) nd that government grants has a partial crowding out
e¤ect on funding-rasing e¤orts and donations to nonprot groups, i.e. overall funds
to the organizations increased but private donations decreased somewhat. Frey and
coauthors nd that regulation (extrinsic motivation) can reduce individualsintrinsic
motivation to protect environment if the instrument damages the marginal utility of
intrinsic motivation(Frey, 1992; Frey, 1997a; Frey 1997b; Frey and Oberholzer-Gee,
1997).3
3There are also studies that focus on crowding e¤ect on individual behavior. For example, Ben-
abou and Tirole (2003) have studied crowding e¤ects of extrinsic motivation on intrinsic motivation
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In the eld of agricultural land and open space preservation, Parker and Thru-
man(2008) examine whether federal land conservation and preservation programs
crowd out the e¤orts of private land trusts in terms of retaining open space. They
construct a panel data at the county level from 1990 to 2000 and evaluate the crowd-
ing e¤ects using a panel regression framework. They examine acreage data for the
Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), Wetland Reserve Program (WRP), and the
national parks and forest. The private land trust acreage data are from The Nature
Conservancy (TNC) and Land Trust Alliance (LTA). Crowding in e¤ect is found from
LTA data; LTA increases acres in areas with high enrollment in CRP, WRP and re-
tained parkland. Both crowding in and crowding out e¤ects are detected for TNCs
activities.
In this section, I evaluate the e¤ect of RL program by isolating the crowding ef-
fects of RL program on existing agricultural land preservation programs. Di¤erent
from Parker and Thurman (2008), I study the crowding e¤ects on preservation e¤orts
from designated preservation areas measured by the likelihood and acres of preser-
vation using micro-level parcel data including characteristics that a¤ect a parcels
predisposition to be preserved. I specify the conditions under which crowding in or
out could occur and empirically test whether there is a crowding in or out e¤ect.
from an economic and cognitive perspective. They nd that extrinsic motivations (reward or punish-
ment) can crowd out individualsintrinsic motivation if the individuals (agents) infer from extrinsic




This section provides a conceptual framework of land preservation programsstrate-
gies, landownersdecisions on preserving land, and the potential crowding e¤ects of
the RL program on the non-RL programs.4 I assume in this model that a community
has two areas: a RL area and a non-RL area. A non-RL program has been operating
in the community to preserve farmland that otherwise would be developed in both
areas. RL program enters later and only focuses on the parcels in the RL area.
Crowding e¤ects are evaluated by comparing non-RL programs preservation ef-
forts in two cases: when only the non-RL program exists, and when both programs
exist. If the non-RL program shifts its preservation e¤orts from a non-RL area into
a RL area after the RL program is introduced, one nds a crowding in e¤ect; or if
it shifts its preservation e¤ort from a RL area to a non-RL area, one would nd a
crowding out e¤ect.
RL program can inuence non-RL programs preservation e¤orts within the RL
area in three ways. First, the RL program can let the non-RL program move rst
to preserve the most a¤ordable parcels so that the non-RL program is not forced to
preserve in the non-RL area. Second, the RL program could design a payment scheme
that is complimentary rather than competitive to the easement payment scheme of
the non-RL program. Third, the RL program can provide matching funds for the
parcels preserved by the non-RL program and reduce the marginal cost of preserving
parcels in the RL area for the non-RL program.
There areM units of agricultural land in RL area andN units in non-RL area that
would be developed in the future if not being preserved. A landowner is endowed with
4In addition to the RL program, both county and state preservation programs can operate in RL
areas and I treat all those programs as one non Rural Legacy program to simplify the problem.
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one unit of agricultural land. WTAi is a landowner i0s willingness-to-accept for giving
up a parcels development right permanently.5 To induce the landowner to preserve
his land, the non-RL program o¤ers landowner i an easement payment EVi and RL
program o¤ers an EV i . Both EVi and EV i are determined by land characteristics
and the programs evaluation criterions. Neither EVi nor EV i is a¤ected by the
available budgets of the two programs. i 2 [0; 1] indicates which program pays the
landowner of unit i for preserving his land. i = 1 if unit i is enrolled only in the
RL program, and i = 0 if only in the non-RL program, and i 2 (0; 1) if the RL
program provides matching funds to non-RL program and the parcel is enrolled in
both programs.
The owners of the M units of land in the RL area can either participate in the
RL or Non-RL program while the owners of the parcels in the non-RL area can only
participate in the non-RL program. The total easement payment for land unit i 2M ,
if being preserved, is: iEV i+(1 i)EVi and EVi for i 2 N . Landowner i is willing
to preserve his land only if the easement payment exceeds his willingness-to-accept:
WTAi  EVi for i 2 N and WTAi  iEV i + (1   i)EVi for i 2 M . Otherwise,
landowner i will not preserve but develop his land in the future. A parcel is preserved
if a willing landowner is paid the easement value (i = 1) and is not preserved
otherwise (i = 0).
I assume that the budget for the non-RL and RL programs are always binding.6
This assumption implies that not all the landowners who are willing to preserve
their land nally enroll their land into a conservation program. I also assume that
5WTAi is determined by agricultural prots, benets from developing land now, the option value
for leaving land to be developed in the future, and the expectation for losing development rights due
to future regulation.
6This is a realistic assumption as MALPF have run out of money in several years.
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land value, and thus, WTAi is not a¤ected by the land preservation for simplicity
purpose, i.e., there is no positive or negative amenity spillover e¤ect of neighboring
preserved parcels.7 Land preservation programs aim to preserve all the units given
their available budgets.
Baseline: no RL program
The maximization problem for the non-RL program, if the RL program does not exist,




To illustrate the solutions, I assume in the rest of the paper that all the owners are
willing to preserve their land (WTAi  EVi) and sort the easement payment EVi in
an ascending order. Non-RL program chooses an optimal cut-o¤ value  such that:









RL program interacts with non-RL program
The RL program is introduced to preserve parcels in the RL area. The RL program
will preserve as many units as possible in RL area given its budget constraint B:
7A positive spatial amenity spillover e¤ect implies that neighboring parcels become more likely
being converted later on and require higher easement payments than the same parcels that do not
have its neighboring parcels being preserved. The static framework in this paper, however, is not




iiEV i  B . The non-RL program again maximizes total parcels preserved in







As discussed earlier, the RL program can interact with the non-RL program in
three ways: let the non-RL program move rst to preserve low cost parcels (scenario
A), o¤er a higher easement payment (scenario B), and provide matching funds for
parcels preserved by the non-RL program(scenario C).
However, the underlying assumption for the above three scenarios is that parcels
in and out of RL area are of equal value to the non-RL program. It is possible that
the introduction of RL program increases the social benets of preserving RL land
and the non-RL program is willing to preserve RL parcels even if they become more
expensive (Scenario D).
I discuss the solutions of the maximization problem and the possible crowding
e¤ects given these four scenarios.
Scenario A: When the RL program lets the non-RL programmove rst to preserve
a¤ordable parcels, the non-RL program will choose to preserve the same parcels as it
did before the RL program entered. The RL program then preserves the parcels in
RL area that are less a¤ordable to the non-RL program.
However, the RL program may crowd out the preservation e¤orts of the non-RL
program if it does not let the non-RL program select which parcels to preserve rst.
If not, the RL program may preserve some or all of the parcels that the non-RL
program would have preserved and force the non-RL program to shift its focus to the
now relatively less expensive non-RL parcels. More non-RL and less RL parcels are
preserved when there is a crowding out e¤ect.
Scenario B: When the RL program sets a higher easement payment than the
non-RL program (EV i  EVi), it crowds out the preservation e¤orts of the non-RL
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program. All preserved parcels in the RL area are enrolled in the RL program until
its budget is exhausted. More non-RL parcels are preserved if there is a crowding out
e¤ect. However, RL program will not crowd out the preservation e¤ort of non-RL
program if the RL program only pays a higher easement payment (EV i  EVi) for
the parcels with EVi  WTAi. Furthermore, the case under which the RL program
pays a lower easement payment is not incentive compatible.
Scenario C: The RL program can provide matching funds to the non-RL program
to preserve RL parcels. I assume that the RL program o¤ers the same easement
payment for a parcel (EV i = EVi) in this case. There could be a crowding in or out
e¤ect depending on the distribution of the easement value and the magnitude of the
matching funds. For example, if the matching funds are not large enough to reduce
the cost of enrolling the next RL parcel, the non-RL program would still preserve the
relatively less expensive non-RL parcels. The RL program therefore crowds out the
preservation e¤orts of non-RL program and more non-RL parcels are preserved.
Alternatively, if the matching funds are large enough to make the RL parcels
relatively less expensive than the non-RL parcels, the non-RL program will preserve
exclusively in the RL area. This can happen if the easement values of the expensive
RL parcels are not prohibitively high or the matching funds are substantial. The
non-RL program would shift its preservation e¤ort from the non-RL area into the
RL area in order to preserve more units of land. Less non-RL parcels and more RL
parcels are preserved by the joint e¤ort of the RL and non-RL programs.
Scenario D: In the above three scenarios, I assume that the non-RL program
values RL parcels the same as non-RL parcels. However, preserving RL parcels can
provide higher social benets than preserving non-RL parcels due to concentrated
preservation in the targeted area. This induces the change in non-RL programs
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evaluation of the environmental benets from preserving RL parcels after the RL
program was introduced. The non-RL program may be more willing to preserve the
more expensive parcels in RL area than in the non-RL area. Hence, there may exist
a crowding in e¤ect even if the RL program does not allow the non-RL program to
move rst, o¤ers a high easement payment, or does not provide matching funds to
the non-RL program.
To summarize, if parcels in and out of RL areas are valued equally by the non-RL
program, the RL program crowds out the non-RL programs preservation e¤ort if
it does not let the non-RL program select parcels rst or it o¤ers higher easement
payment. When the RL program provides matching funds to the parcels in RL areas
preserved by the non-RL program, crowding e¤ects can go either way. Whether
there is a crowding in or a crowding out e¤ect depends on the magnitude of the
matching funds and the distribution of the easement value. If the introduction of
the RL program cause preserving parcels in RL areas to be su¢ ciently more valuable
than preserving parcels out of RL areas, there is a crowding in e¤ect even if the RL
program compete with the non-RL programs.
3.6.2 The violation of Stable Unit Treatment Value Assump-
tion (SUTVA) and multiple causal e¤ects
Matching method (also randomized experiment) implicitly uses the assumption of
"no interference between units" (Cox, 1958, p19) or the Stable Unit Treatment Value
Assumption named by Rubin (1986). This assumption says that the potential out-
comes of an individual depend on the treatment assigned to this individual but not
the treatment assigned to other individuals or the allocation of other individuals to
the treatment. The validity of SUTVA is assumed for matching method. The validity
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is warranted if the policy under consideration is rather small in size, if market e¤ects
are unlikely, or if the counterfactual world against which the policy is evaluated is
such that similar distortions through market and general equilibrium e¤ects would
persist (Frölich, 2003). An ATT estimator from matching method is the net impact
of a treatment only if this assumption holds. However, this assumption might be
invalidated if individuals interact to each other, either directly or through market.8
When SUTVA is invalidated (or general equilibrium e¤ect exists), controls can no
longer provide the desired counterfactual to treated individuals for the treatment of
interest. As a result, the estimated ATT from matching is no longer the accurate
measure of treatment e¤ect. Rather, it is a combination of multiple causal e¤ects
besides that of the treatment of interest. Those causal e¤ects include the direct e¤ect
and indirect e¤ects of treatment of interest, e.g. the e¤ect of the treatment assignment
to an individual and the treatment assignment to other individuals. The question is:
can one isolate di¤erent causal e¤ects using a matching method?
SUTVA violation makes causal inference more di¢ cult. It will be almost impossi-
ble to identify or isolate the causal e¤ects if treatment assignment to any individual
a¤ects any other individuals outcome. The reason is that there will be too many
causal e¤ects to be identied. However, if one can reduce the interference of treat-
ment assignment to a limited number of groups of individuals, it is possible to identify
the limited number of causal e¤ects. For example, Hong and Raudenbush (2006) im-
pose a structure over the interaction of individuals to reduce the number of potential
outcomes in evaluating kindergarten retention policy in the US. They model the im-
pact of treatment assignment to an individual as operating through the individuals
8The violation of the SUTVA, or the presence of general equlibrium is not just an issue for
matching method. It also applies to all partial eqlibrium estimators.
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treatment assignment and a scalar function of all the otherstreatment assignment.
The scalar function takes two values: 1 if a high proportion of kindergartners are
retained and 0 if not. Therefore, the number if causal e¤ects in their study is reduced
to a manageable level.9
In the case of RL program, the violation of SUTVA, in the conventionalway, is
the possibility that inclusion or exclusion of any single parcel a¤ecting the outcomes
(preservation status) of the other parcels. However, this is less of an issue than
the shifting of non-RL programs preservation e¤orts in or out of RL areas. The
crowding e¤ect of RL program becomes one of the multiple causal e¤ects induced
by the violation of SUTVA. As long as the CIA (CMI assumption) or ignorability of
treatment assignment assumption holds, I can employ matching method and restrict
matching between di¤erent sub-samples to isolate di¤erent e¤ects.
3.6.3 Empirical specications
Assign the outcome variables of the RL program as Yit. Besides a set of exogenous
variables Xi, and a dummy variable representing treatment status RLit, a crowding
e¤ect of RL program, Cit, also a¤ects the outcome. The impact of crowding e¤ects
9There are also studies that discuss causal inference using other approaches and in di¤erent con-
texts. In a randomized experiment context, Sobel (2006) proposes an identication strategy and
the parameters of interest in the housing mobility experiment sponsored by the US Department of
Housing and Urban Development. Halloran and Struchiner (1995) study the e¤ect of vaccine on
infectious diseases by dening conditional direct casual e¤ects. Heckman, Lochner, and Taber
(1998) use a general equilibrium approach to study the e¤ect of national tuition subsidy on college
enrollment and earnings. Their methods, as pointed out by Sobel (2006) combine empirical infor-
mation and mathematical modeling without using the potential outcomes notation that statisticians
have used to clarify problems of causal inference.
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on preservation in and out RL areas goes to opposite directions. t = ft0; t1g indicates
a pre- or post-treatment period the same as in section 3.5. Cit = 0 in period t0 and
Cit = 1 in period t1. The outcome equations for a parcel in its two treatment status
can be written as:
Y 0it = gt(Xi) + it(Xi)  Cit + U0it (3.5)
Y 1it = gt(Xi)  it(Xi)  Cit + it(Xi) RL1it + U1it (3.6)
Uit is the error term and Uit = i + t + "it. Uit decomposes to an individual
specic xed e¤ect i, an impact from local economic growth t, and a temporary
individual-specic e¤ect "it. The individual xed e¤ect, i, a¤ects the preservation
e¤ort of other programs and allows me to control their impact. The selection into
treatment states is independent of "it.
The di¤erent parameters of interest can be expressed as:
Average treatment e¤ect on the treated (ATT), or the direct e¤ect of the RL
program on the outcome:
ERL = E
 
itjXi; RL1it = 1

(3.7)








itjXi; RL0it1 = 0

(3.8)
The e¤ect of time-invariant unobservables i:
E = E
 




The e¤ect of exogenous parcel attributes :
EX = E (g (Xi)) (3.10)
The e¤ect of local economic growth:
E = E
 
tjXi; RL1it = 1

(3.11)
Figure 3.4 is an demonstration of the impacts from di¤erent elements. The four
quadrants dene four sub-samples. The non-RL and pre-treatment quadrant denes
the pre-treatment non-RL sample, whose preservation outcomes are clearly a¤ected
only by the desirability of their observed attributes to non-RL programs. The second
quadrant (RL areas and pre-treatment) is the pre-treatment RL sample, which is
preserved by non-RL programs. The preservation outcomes are a¤ected by both
observed and unobserved parcel attributes that are attractive to non-RL programs.
The post-treatment non-RL sample, dened in the third quadrant(non-RL and post-
treatment) are preserved by non-RL programs. However, its preservation outcomes
are subject to the impact of crowding e¤ects from RL program and time e¤ect. The
last quadrant denes the post-treatment RL group which can be preserved by both
RL and non-RL programs. The preservation outcomes are a¤ected by all factors:
observed and unobserved parcel attributes, preservation e¤ort from RL program,
crowding e¤ect of RL program, and time e¤ect. The crowding e¤ect for this sample
is opposite to that for the sample of post-treatment non-RL parcels (parcels out of
RL areas).
The following three equations (3.12)-(3.14) from restricting matching between
di¤erent sub-samples can be used to identify di¤erent parameters:
E
 


















=  2EC + ERL + E (3.13)
E
 






=  EC + E   E (3.14)
Identication strategy one
It is obvious that the equations (3.12)-(3.14) are not enough to identify all the para-
meter of interest. However, if I can eliminate the time e¤ect of E by imposing the
same time frame for pre- and post-treatment groups, the rest of the parameters can
be identied. The time frames for the pre- and post-treatment groups are centered on
the year when the RL program was introduced. I then rule out time-varying factors,
e.g. dramatically change in the funding from other programs occurred in the pre-
and post-treatment periods which is supported by the evidence in table 3.2.10 The
10As shown in table 3.2, the budget of MALPF increases over time. However, the easement vlaue
and acquision cost of farmland also increases over time. The increment of the two are comparable
for pre- and post- treatment periods.
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parameter of E is cancelled out of equation (3.14).
E
 






=  EC + E (3.15)
The parameters ERL, EC , and E can then be identify from equation (3.12), (3.13)
and (3.15).
For a treated and a control parcels that are observably identical, the following
conditions hold.
First, the pre-treatment outcome is not a¤ected by RL program (does not
exist) and the di¤erence in pre-treatment outcome between the two parcels captures
the e¤ect of the non-RL program (predisposition e¤ect).
Second, post-treatment outcome of untreated parcels is indirectly a¤ected
by the RL program through the possible crowding e¤ect. Therefore, the di¤erence
between the post-treatment outcome of untreated parcel and pre-treatment outcome
of treated parcel captures the crowding e¤ect together with the predisposition e¤ect.
Third, the di¤erence in post-treatment outcome captures the crowding e¤ect
and predisposition e¤ect.
The three unknown e¤ects can be then identied by the three conditions.
This strategy, however, cannot guarantee that the impact of local economic growth,
E, that a¤ect the available budget for non-RL program, is eliminated completely.
The presence of E can bias the estimation of the crowding e¤ect. As a result, the
estimation returns an upper round of the crowding e¤ect if the time e¤ect and the
crowding e¤ect go to the same direction.
Identication strategy two
My data records whether a parcel is preserved by RL program or non-RL program
and that RL and non-RL programs do not provide matching funding to each other.
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I than can eliminate the net impact of RL program by excluding the parcels that are
preserved by RL program. Then equation (3.13) is now restricted to a sub-sample
excluding parcels preserved by RL program and becomes:
E
 






=  2EC + E (3.16)
The equation (3.12) together with (3.16) identies EC and E. Plug EC and E
into equation (3.13), I can solve for ERL. This strategy does not need equation (3.15)
so that I can avoid the possible bias due to time e¤ect.
3.6.4 Empirical estimation and results
I construct two treated and two control groups. The two treated groups are: pre-
treatment RL group and post-treatment RL group. The two control groups are:
pre-treatment non-RL group and post-treatment non-RL group. The treated and
control groups are mutually exclusive. The pre-treatment and post-treatment treated
(control) groups are overlapped with the parcels that are never protected by any
programs. The parcels that are enrolled in any preservation programs after RL areas
were designated are included in pre-treatment groups but those parcels appear as
being unprotected. The post-treatment groups exclude the parcels that are enrolled
in any preservation programs before the RL areas are designated.
For strategy one, I conduct matching based on estimated propensity scores in
three ways across the four sub-samples. First, I match pre-treatment RL group with
pre-treatment non-RL group for equation (3.12). Second, I match post-treatment
non-RL group with post-treatment RL group for equation (3.13). Thirdly, I match
post-treatment non-RL group to the pre-treatment RL group for equation (3.14).
For strategy two, I rst match pre-treatment RL group with pre-treatment non-
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Table 3.7: Balancing test results for restricting matching between di¤erent sub-samples
RL group for equation (3.12). Second, I match post-treatment non-RL group with
post-treatment RL group for equation (3.13). Third, I exclude the parcels being
preserved by RL program in the post-treatment RL group and conduct matching
between post-treatment RL and non-RL groups for equation (3.16).
Balancing test results are presented in Table 3.7. Most of the variables pass bal-
ance tests except for the permeability and erodeability variables for all matching
protocols. Theoretically, parcels with higher permeability levels and lower erode-
ability would be more likely to be developed rather than preserved. The failure of
balance test for the variables could induce downward bias in the estimated ATT for
all matching protocols and for the impact of non-RL programs. However, its e¤ect
on the estimation of crowding e¤ect and net impact of RL program is unclear.
Estimation results for crowding e¤ect, EC , predisposition e¤ect, E, and nally
the e¤ect of RL program, ERL, are presented in Table 3.8 for identication strategy
one and in Table 3.9 for strategy two.


































































































matchings are signicant at 5% level. While for matching of post-treatment non-RL
group vs. pre-treatment RL group, only the ATT for likelihood of preservation is
signicant at 5% level. For identication strategy two, the ATTs from all matching
protocols are signicant at 5% level. The estimated ATTs vary little across the two
matching methods and identication strategies.
The estimated predisposition e¤ect, E, in terms of the likelihood of being pre-
served, is 2:6 percentage points, and in acres is 1:49  1:57. This result indicates that
there exist time-invariant unobserved attributes that di¤erentiate parcels in and out
of RL areas. Such di¤erence attracts more preservation e¤orts of non-RL programs
before RL program was introduced. The identication strategy two nds a crowding
in e¤ect in terms of both likelihood of preservation and acres preserved. While the
strategy one nds a contradictory result: a crowding in e¤ect in terms of likelihood of
preservation and crowding out e¤ect for acres preserved. This di¤erence in estimation
results for strategy one may due to unintended time e¤ect.
The crowded in preservation e¤orts increase preservation probability in RL areas
by 0:7 1:0 percentage points, and increases the preserved acres by 0:2 0:23. In spite
of the crowding in e¤ect, RL program has positive impact on preservation outcomes on
two levels: a higher likelihood of preservation and more acres/larger preserved parcels.
The results show that RL designation increases the probability of preservation by
5:5  6 percentage points and preserved acres by 9  12.
The estimation in this section, however, implicitly assumes that the predisposition
e¤ect and time e¤ect is separable. There may exist interaction between the two
e¤ects, e.g. predisposition e¤ect is time variant. If this happens, the crowding e¤ect
cannot be identied using the proposed strategies. However, the net impact of RL
program can still be identied.
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3.7 Conclusion
In an attempt to encourage more contiguous preservation, Maryland introduced
the Rural Legacy program to preserve large contiguous blocks of land with high social
value. Local entities designate preservation areas and become eligible for special
funding. The designation of the RL program interacts with and could crowd in or
out the preservation e¤orts of the existing agricultural preservation programs.
The empirical analysis in this paper suggest a crowding in e¤ect of the RL pro-
gram on the other preservation programs. Overall, the designation appears to have
a positive impact on acres retained and on probability of preservation for the identi-
ed areas. The program has enrolled more acres and larger parcels due to the extra
funding and the new payment schemes based less on market appraisals. However, it
is unclear how the crowding in e¤ect impact land conversion, and overall whether the
RL program with a crowding in e¤ect reduces land conversion.
Empirical literature has found contradictory e¤ects of land preservation programs
on farmland conversion. On one hand, studies nd that land preservation programs
may impose higher development pressure to neighboring regions. For example, Irwin
(2002) has found that preserving neighboring open space increases housing value by
$1000 to $3300. Geoghegan, Lynch, and Bucholtz (2003) nd that preserved open
space increases property values on adjacent residential parcels in Calvert and Howard
Counties in Maryland. Roe, Irwin, and Morrow-Jones (2004) nd that preservation
e¤orts can generate positive amenities for adjacent homeowners in the form of guar-
anteed open-space and therefore accelerate conversion. On the other hand, empirical
evidence suggests that the option to preserve farmland provided by farmland preser-
vation programs may delay land development. Using a real option approach, Towe,
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Nickerson and Bockstael (2008) nd that the parcels qualied for a preservation op-
tion have a 50% lower hazard rate of being developed than unqualied parcels in
Howard County, Maryland.
To certain extent, RL program is to avoid to the above-mentioned negative impact
on neighboring parcels as it provides continued funding until the contiguous blocks
of land are permanently protected. As written in the Rural Legacy Program Grant
Manual (2001), sponsors should seek to focus or target their continued funds to protect
contiguous blocks of land, rather than scattered parcels that may be individually
signicant, but which could be surrounded or otherwise adversely a¤ected in the
future by development or unprotected lands. Thus, it would be interesting to study
the impact of RL program on landowners asking price for land preservation, market
value of land and land conversion as the next step. The crowding in e¤ect could slow




Land Development Restrictions and Preemptive
Action
4.1 Introduction
The Endangered Species Act (ESA), which was passed in 1973, gives federal agen-
cies the power to limit or prohibit any activities that possibly destruct habitat for
endangered and threatened species. Although the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Con-
stitution states that nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation, limiting property rights under the ESA does not generally grant com-
pensation. In 1983, Congress amended the ESA by adding section 10(a) under which
a landowner or a group of landowners can obtain an Incidental Taking Permit (ITP)
from Fish and Wildlife Services (FWS) to incidentally takea listed species. A "No
Surprise" policy was also issued in 1994 to protect landowners from bearing the cost
from having to alter HCP due to any unforeseen future change.
Despite these provisions, developing an HCP can lead to substantial costs. This
risk of being deprived of development rights or facing larger costs of development
can give private landowners incentives to destroy habitat or potential habitat be-
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fore a species is listed or a Critical Habitat Area takes e¤ect. Indeed, Lueck and
Michael(2003) nd that the list of Red-cockaded woodpecker (RCW) in North Car-
olina caused signicant habitat destruction. List et al. (2005) nd that Critical
Habitat designation boosted overall acceleration of land development by one year.
The induced preemptive behaviors of landowners contradict the goal of ESA: to pro-
tect Endangered Species,1 which might impose negative impact on society in terms
of more serious habitat destruction or earlier loss of habitat for endangered species.
Alternatively to preemptively developing their land, landowners might try to put
extra e¤ort to negotiate HCPs (or to submit an extensive HCP at the rst place) with
more favorable terms, i.e. less costs. This negotiation approach clearly can lead to
di¤erent regulation levels for di¤erent landowners. Although it reduces preemption,
the negotiation approach (compromise) can induce more land development in the
future.
In this chapter, I address the issue of preemptive land development, compromise,
and di¤erentiated treatment of landowners. The listing of Endangered Species or the
designation of Critical Habitat can be viewed as changes of regulatory status. Such
changes impose extra cost on land development in the future due to the requirement
of a HCP for an ITP. In order to avoid the cost, some landowners develop land be-
fore the new regulation takes e¤ect (preemption). The preemptive land development
causes earlier habitat loss or even more serious habitat destruction than it should
be. Regulator can reduce preemption through reducing the standard for HCP, there-
fore the extra cost for future land development. Social welfare can be improved as
1The listing process of a endangered species or Critical Habitat design is long and usually take
about two years and even longer. Landowners, foreseeing the deprivation of their development
right in the future, would take action to acquire building or construction permits before the list of
endangered species or critical habitat takes e¤ect.
100
compromise reduces preemptive land development. However, compromise can, at the
same time, induce welfare loss as it allows more land being developed after a new
regulation takes e¤ect. A regulator, as a social welfare maximizer, will have to bal-
ance the two e¤ects: improving social welfare from reducing preemption and harming
social welfare from allowing more land being developed in the future.
I use a two-period model similar to Miceli and Segerson (1996) and assume irre-
versibility of development decisions. I derive the conditions under which compromise
can improve welfare and, more important, demonstrate that di¤erentiated treatment
can be benecial in order to avoid preemption by landowners. I thereby explicitly con-
sider the case that landowners are heterogeneous in their propensity to develop land
in either of the two periods or never. Furthermore, the future value of developed land
is subject to ex ante uncertainty. While preemptive development reduces/eliminates
the costs from future regulation, it may induce opportunity cost of landowners in
second period when the realized value for developing land in the future is high.
In the analysis, I focus on how the development decision of landowners is a¤ected
by regulatory stringency levels, i.e. the costs of development in the second period.
As di¤erent landowners have di¤erent thresholds above which to preempt, I show
when a regulator should compromise and how he can create di¤erentiated policies
for di¤erent types of landowners to reduce preemption. The downside to such a
policy are the information requirements on the side of the regulator. The case of
asymmetric information is therefore addressed in this chapter. Using a mechanism
design approach, I show that still a di¤erentiated treatment of landowners might be
benecial. This mechanism allows some landowners to receive a reduced costs of
development in the second period against an ex ante payment.
In the ESA context, I can interpret this mechanism as di¤erent landowners having
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di¤erent incentives to submit an extensive HCP or put more e¤ort to communicate
with di¤erent interests groups for a larger waiver of future land development cost
imposed by the ESA. This treatment under the situation of asymmetric information
provides a new and important rationale for di¤erentiated treatment of landowners as
in bilaterally negotiated HCPs.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. I review literature on regu-
latory takings, discuss ESA and the incentive for preemption in Section 4.2. Section
4.3 is the theoretical model. Section 4.3.1 gives the basic setup of the theoretical
model. I discuss the case of rst-best regulation in section 4.3.2 and then show how
the missing regulation in the rst period can lead to preemption (Section 4.3.3). The
optimal regulation under perfect information is discussed in Section 4.3.4. I distin-
guish the case where the regulator can di¤erentiate policies across landowners and
the case where he is restricted to a one-ts-all regulation. Section 4.3.5 then discusses
regulation under asymmetric information. I then discuss possible extensions to the
model and conclude in Section 4.4.
4.2 Regulatory Takings and Endangered Species
Act
The ESA, described as one of the most comprehensive and controversial wildlife laws,
has received much discussions and opposition. According to a research by Hendrickson
(2005) on the coverage of the ESA from September 2002 to September 2003 in four
major newspapers (Chicago Tirbune, Los Angeles Times, the New York Times, and
the Washington Post), the ESA received the second highest number of references in
the year among all the major federal environmental statutes, second only to the Clean
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Air Act. ESA is criticized on one hand for ine¤ectiveness of protecting species, and
on the other hand for its lack of "fairness"harming landownersland development
rights for public interests. According to Hendrickson (2005), ESA, on one hand, is
criticized for killing construction plans for hospitals, schools, depriving of water rights,
land development rights, and so on. It, on the other hand, is criticized as not doing
enough and not e¤ective to protect the mother nature.
An extensive literature has developed that discusses compensation or taxation
schemes in order to deal with individual landownersnon-optimal incentives to de-
velop land or make costly investments under the threat of takings. The rationale for
regulation is the divergence of the private from the public value of land and the in-
duced externalities from private land development. Starting with Blume et al. (1984),
many authors have addressed the issue of compensation for takings in order to reect
the above notion of property rights. Innes et al. (1998), Innes (1997, 2000), Shapiro
(2003) and others show that compensation can be problematic as it might distort in-
vestment decisions. Miceli and Segerson (1994) suggest a compensation scheme which
conditions payments on the optimal land use decision in an earlier period. While the
studies of compensation apply directly to much of current legislation, limiting prop-
erty rights under the ESA does not generally grant compensation.
The ESA make it illegal to kill, harm or take a listed endangered or threatened
species (ESA Section 9). The take for endangered animal is dened as harass,
harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect. The harm is
dened as which actually injures or kills wildlife, including acts which annoy it to
such an extent as to signicantly disrupt essential behavioral patterns, which include,
but are not limited to, breeding, feeding, or sheltering, and signicantly environmental
modication or degradation which has such e¤ect. For plants takemeans that it
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is unlawful to collect or maliciously damage any endangered plant on land under
Federal jurisdiction. Removing or damaging listed plants on State and private land
in knowing violation of State law, or in the course of violating a State criminal trespass
law, also is illegal under the ESA (ESA section 3).
The denitions link take and harm to private landowners right to use or
develop their land. A private landowner has an obligation to prevent the takingof
the endangered species inhabit in his land. In 1975, FWS promulgated regulations
dening harm to include some forms of habitat modication. If an endangered or
threatened species is identied in their land or their land is identied to be potential
habitat for an endangered species, it is unlawful for the landowner to harvest timber,
shing, develop land to residential or commercial use or other agricultural activities
as those activities are likely to harmthe species.
In 1983, Congress amended the ESA by adding section 10(a) under which a
landowner or a group of landowners can obtain an Incidental Taking Permit (ITP)
from Fish and Wild life Services (FWS) to incidentally take a listed species. In
exchange for a ITP, landowners have to prepare a Habitat Conservation Plan (HCP)
that aims to minimize and mitigate the impact of permitted land development. That
is, by bearing some costs for addressing public concerns regarding endangered species,
the landowners keep the right to develop their property. In 1994, Former Secretary
of the Interior Bruce Babbitt issued a "No Surprise" policy. This policy allows the
insertion of a provision in every HCP that if changes to the plan were necessary due
to unforeseen circumstances, the private landowner would not be required to pay for
the implementation of those changes. Landowners apparently appreciated the added
certainty of the policy. In the year between 1982 and 1994, before the No surprise
policy was adopted, a total of 21 HCPs were approved. In 1995 alone, a total of 34
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were approved and by September 30, 2007, 536 plans have been approved. (FWS,
Conservation Plans and Agreements Database, 2007)
In reality, most section 10(a) permits have been issued only after elaborate nego-
tiations between applicants, FWS, local planning agencies, and other local interest
groups. There are no statutory time-frames for the permit process, and most applica-
tions take years for development and approval (an average of 5 years according to the
team of Etowah aquatic habitat conservation plan). Although the FWS attempted to
streamline the permitted process for low-e¤ect HCPs to 3 months and 6-12 months
for HCPs that require Environmental Assessment or Environmental Impact State-
ment from the date they are submitted to FWS, it is time consuming and expensive
to develop a HCP. For examples, the Clark County Habitat Conservation Plan (30
year for protecting desert tortoise) in the state of Nevada, takes 4 years to reach an
agreement and being approved (1992-1995) (Bernazzani, 1998). A multi-species HCP
in San Diego County has taken more than seven years to develop and will cost more
than $400 million over 20 years to implement (Merrick, 1998). Etowah aquatic HCP
in Georgia takes 5 years to develop and receive approval from FWS (Etowah aquatic
habitat conservation plan).
Although being costly and time-consuming, the negotiation process allows landown-
ers to bargain with FWS on the extent they have to protect species through HCPs
through various ways. This is sometimes criticized as a shortcoming of HCPs and
claimed that many of the plans favor development over endangered species and prone
to inuence by interest groups. Anecdotal evidence of interest groups exerting pres-
sure to protect development rights is common: in the case of the Pygmy Owl in
Arizona, the National Association of Home Builders and other associations launched
a lawsuit against the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Services critical habitat designation and
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the U.S. Supreme Court set aside the designation in 2001. In the case of endangered
species, Ando (1999) nds that public opposition and support can substantially slow
or hasten the listing process of species into endangered or threatened. McClure and
Sti­ er (2005a, 2005b) discuss the issue of HCP formulation in the Seattle Post Intel-
ligencer criticizing the major inuence of interest groups and the focus on allowing
investment.
Despite those criticism, this way of compromise may represent the best hope to
gain landownerss willingness to protect listed species while taking their property
right for public interests without compensation. According to a 1993 study by the
Association for Biodiversity Information and the Nature Conservancy, half of listed
species have at least 80% of their habitat on private land. About 90% of the listed
species are found on private land (Brown et. al 1998). Because of the dependence of
endangered species on private land, private landowners participation in endangered
species conservation is critical to successful species recovery.
4.3 Theoretical Model
4.3.1 Basic setup
The model is built upon a two-period framework and is similar to Miceli and Segerson
(1996). I model a community with N landowners who each owns one unit of undevel-
oped land. A landowner can choose to develop his land in period 1, period 2 or never
to develop his land. The value of one unit of developed land to landowners is identical
for every landowner and is denoted in period 1 by V 1D. The value in period 2, v
2
D, is
uncertain in period 1, follows a distribution G(v2D) (density g(v
2
D) > 0 on the support
[v2; v2]), and is revealed before the start of the second period. Landowners di¤er with
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respect to the value of their land if left undeveloped, denoted by V 1i and V
2
i in the
two periods, respectively. The value of undeveloped land is known to the landowner
but not necessarily to the regulator. I consider both the case of perfect information
and of asymmetric information in which a regulator is not perfectly informed on the
specic land values.
Land development generates negative externalities to the community. The (net
present value of the) negative externality is E1 per parcel of land if it is developed in
period 1 and E2 if in period 2. Landowners are assumed to care only about the value
of their land and not about externalities.
To address these externalities, I assume that the regulator considers a taxation of
development, which is equivalent to imposing a develop cost, at level  t in period t.
The timeline of the events is: (1) the regulator proposes regulation which takes e¤ect
in period 2, (2) landowners make individual decisions whether they develop land in
period 1. (3) the value of land in period 2, v2D is revealed, (4) landowners decide on
development in period 2.
4.3.2 Private vs. socially optimal development decisions
Given regulation ( 1;  2), I rst consider the private decisions of the respective landown-
ers. I start with the decision in period 2, given that the landowner i leaves the land
undeveloped in period 1.
Here, landowner i develops land if
v2D    2 > V 2i (4.1)
and leaves the land undeveloped otherwise. Taking this decision into account, leaving
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land undeveloped gives an option value in the rst period





[v2D    2]dG(v2D) + V 2i G(V 2i +  2) (4.2)
which leads to the following decision rule in the rst period: landowner i develops
the land in the rst period if and only if
V 1D    1 > V 1i +O(V 2i ;  2): (4.3)
It is obvious, that the socially optimal land development potentially deviates from
the private incentives. In period 2, it is socially optimal to develop land if
v2D   E2 > V 2i (4.4)
and therefore, land should only be developed in period 1 if
V 1D   E1 > V 1i +O(V 2i ; E2) (4.5)
Comparing condition (4.3) with (4.5) and (4.1) with (4.4), I obtain the well-known
condition of rst-best Pigouvian taxation:  1 = E1 and  2 = E2. To achieve rst-
best, the regulator necessarily needs to apply taxes in both periods. In this chapter,
however, I focus on a situation where regulation only applies in the future (i.e. in
period 2) and therefore  1 = 0. I therefore study situations where the regulator is
bound to regulate via choosing the tax level  2.
Equation (4.3) implies that the private option value determines the decision to
preempt. To see how land development depends on  2 and the type of the landowner,
I partially di¤erentiate (4.2):
@O
@V 2i
(V 2i ; 
2) = G(V 2i + 
2)  0 (4.6)
@O
@ 2
(V 2i ; 




(V 2i ; 
2) = g(V 2i + 
2) > 0 (4.8)
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From equation (4.1), (4.3), and (4.6)-(4.8), I immediately obtain the following results
for the landownersreactions to changes in the tax system:
Lemma 1 (i) The option value O(V 2i ; 
2) is decreasing in  2 but increasing in V 2i .
Landowners with a larger V 2i benet less from a reduction in 
2.
(ii) A larger  2 reduces a landowners incentive to develop land in the second period,
given that land stayed undeveloped in the rst period. However, a larger  2
generates more incentive for a landowner to develop land in the rst period.
(iii) An increase in  1 leaves the conditional second period decision una¤ected but
decreases development in the rst period.
Lemma 1 (iii) shows that missing regulation in period 1 ( 1 = 0) can drive
landowners into preemption compared with the socially optimal level ( 1 = E1).
Since the option value of postponing the development decision is decreasing in  2
(Lemma 1 (i),(ii)), a way to reduce preemption is to compromise, i.e. to regulate
at  2 < E2 instead of  2 = E2. This way of compromise, however, distorts land
development decision in period 2 (Lemma 1 (ii)).
To analyze preemption given that  1 = 0, it proves helpful to consider the tax
level  2 where landowner of type i is indi¤erent between developing land in the rst
period and not developing. It is denoted by  2i and implicitly dened by:







if a nite solution exists, and  2i =1 if V 1D < V 1i +O(V 2i ;  2) for all nite  2.





 1 = 0, the landowner i develops land in period 1 if and only if  2 >  2i . Shifting
regulation from one side of  2i to the other will induce landowners of type i to change
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their land development decision in period 1. Note that this threshold value can take
positive or negative values. That is, in the extreme case the taxwould have to turn
into a subsidy in order to prevent preemptive action of a landowner.
In order to formally discuss the e¤ect of regulation on social welfare and thereby
the optimal level of compromise, i.e.  2, I introduce the notion of social option value.
It di¤ers from the private option value by the expected value of externality minus the
tax, as the tax payments are considered as a transfer among households:2




[v2D   E2]dG(v2D) + V 2i G(V 2i +  2) (4.9)
= O(V 2i ;  2)  (E2    2)(1 G(V 2i +  2)) (4.10)
Assuming that there are no shadow costs of social funds, and that taxes are redis-
tributed lump sum to households, social welfare is then formally given by:
W ( 2) =
X
i:2>2i







4.3.3 Reducing preemption increasing welfare
While optimal regulation involves  1 = E1 and  2 = E2, I now address the ques-
tion how the regulators decision on  2 should reect the lack of regulation in the
rst period ( 1 = 0). For this, I rst explore how social welfare changes with mar-
ginal changes in the regulation level  2 and discuss the optimal di¤erentiated and
undi¤erentiated taxation in the next section.
Studying conditions (4.7) and (4.9) immediately gives the following result:
@OS
@ 2
(V 2i ; 
2) = (E2    2)g(V 2i +  2): (4.12)
2Compare with Innes (2000) who describes this value as public use value are in private hands
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At a level where  2 6=  2i for all i, any small change of  2 therefore does not induce
any landowner to change his development decision:
@W
@ 2
(0;  2) =
X
i:22i
(E2    2)g(V 2i +  2): (4.13)
At tax level  2i < 1, at which landowner i is indi¤erent between developing land
in period 1 or waiting, a marginal change in  2 induces landowner i to change his
development decision. This implies that the social welfare function is no longer dif-
ferentiable at  2i . The change in social welfare induced by the change in 




W ( 2)  lim
2#2i
W ( 2) = ki[E
1   (E2    2i )(1 G(V 2i +  2i ))] (4.14)
where ki = #fj :  2j =  2i g
Here, lim
2"2
W ( 2) denes the social welfare when  2 is below but su¢ ciently close to
 2i such that the landowners of type i comply with the regulation and do not preempt,
lim
2#2i
W ( 2) when  2 is above and su¢ ciently close to  2i such that landowners of type
i preemptively develop land.
Equations (4.13) and (4.14) describe how marginal changes in  2 a¤ect social
welfare depending on the level of  2 when  1 = 0. If  2 6=  2i for all i, marginal changes
in  2 do not change any landowners development decision in the rst period. Here,
social welfare increases with  2 as long as  2 < E2 since second period development
moves closer to the social 0optimum for all landowners who wait to develop land
(equation 4.13). However, if  2 coincides with  2i for some i, social welfare reacts
discontinuously to a marginal increase in  2: depending on the sign of equation
(4.14), social welfare increases or decreases as landowners with  2 =  2i change their
decision from not developing land in the rst period to preemptively developing land.
The e¤ect of  2 on development decision and social welfare is illustrated in Figures
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Figure 4.1: Illustration of private option values as a function of 2








4.1 demonstrates private value functions and Figure 4.2 social value functions for each
of the two types. When  2 takes values in the ranges of ( 1;  2i ), ( 2i ;  2j), or ( 2j ; E2),
no landowners rst period development decision changes with a marginal change in
 2. For example, if  2 2 ( 2i ;  2j), type i landowner preemptively develops land and
type j complies the regulation. The social welfare function is di¤erentiable and social
welfare increases with  2 in the range. However, at  2 =  2i or 
2 =  2j a marginal
increase of  2 induces landowner i or j to change their development decision in the
rst period. Correspondingly, the social value function is no longer di¤erentiable at
 2i and 
2





2) or V 1j +OS(V
2
j ; 
2) to (V 1D   E1)
at  2i or 
2
j .
From (4.13) and (4.14), I obtain the following lemma:
Lemma 2 When the regulatory instrument is missing in period 1 ( 1 = 0),
(i) second-best welfare W ( 2) is increasing in  2 for  2 < E2 as long as a marginal
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Figure 4.2: Illustration of social option values as a function of 2
decrease in  2 does not change the decision of any landowner in the rst period
and at least one landowner does not develop land in the rst period.
(ii) a marginal decrease of  2 increases welfare if and only if E1 > (E2    2)(1  
G(V 2i + 
2)) at a nite level  2 =  2 where a landowner i is indi¤erent between
developing the land in period 1 or waiting.
Lemma 2 demonstrates two opposing e¤ects of changes in the second period reg-
ulation level  2 on welfare: (i) a reduction of  2 below E2 distorts the second period
development decision and thereby generally reduces welfare (equation 4.13). (ii) If,
however, by a marginal decrease in  2, at least one landowner shifts from preemption
to preserving land in period 1, welfare can increase (equation 4.14). The decision
about a further reduction of the tax rate  i.e. on further compromising must
therefore evaluate whether the negative welfare from landowners who do not develop
land in the rst period (e¤ect (i)) is o¤set by the welfare gain from changing the rst
period development decision of other landowners (e¤ect (ii)).
In particular, note that no distortions occur if  2i  E2 for all i, i.e. if the impossi-
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bility to regulate in the rst period (i.e.  1 = 0) while keeping the second period tax
at  2 = E2 does not induce any landowners to change their rst period decision. Here,
from Lemma 2 (i) it follows that the optimal tax level is still  2 = E2. The case where
the lack of regulation in the rst period leads (some) landowners into preemption is
clearly the more interesting case and the focus of the following analysis.
I distinguish di¤erent versions of the model: I rst consider the case where the
regulator is perfectly informed on the types (i.e. on V ti and therefore on 
2
i ) and (i)
can, (ii) cannot use di¤erentiated policies for di¤erent landowners. In a second step,
I then consider a regulator who is not informed on the types of specic landowners
but bases the policy on beliefs over a distribution of types.
4.3.4 Perfect information
I rst study the case of a perfectly informed regulator who can di¤erentiate policies
across landowners. Here, Lemma 2 immediately implies that the optimal tax level for
the landowner of type i is given by  2i = E
2 if  2i  E2. Further, if  2i < E2 and
E1 > (E2    2i )(1 G(V 2i +  2i )); (4.15)
it is benecial to compromise to bring landowner i out of preemption. The conditions
imply that if  2i <1, but compromising until this level where the landowner chooses
not to preempt would imply E1 < (E2  2i )(1 G(V 2i + 2i )), the landowner should be
left in the preemption mode. In this case, the tax level could be chosen at  2i = E
2.
The intuition behind this result is that bringing one player out of preemption reduces
the externality by E1 but also imposes welfare losses in the second period as the
landowner is more likely to develop land due to the reduced  2. If now, the potential
distortions in the second period, (E2    2i )(1   G(V 2i +  2i )), are severe compared
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to those in the rst period, the landowner should rather be left to preempt. Note,
however, that this case cannot occur if E1  E2.
Proposition 1 A perfectly informed regulator who can di¤erentiate policies across
landowners, should either regulate a landowner at  2 = E2 or  if  2i < E
2 and
E1 > (E2    2i )(1   G(V 2i +  2i )) compromise with the individual landowner in a
way which just makes him slightly better o¤ from not developing in the rst period.
Proposition 1 shows that it is not necessarily optimal for a regulator to compromise
in a way to prevent preemptive behavior. Compromising itself could be more costly
to society than letting the landowner develop the land in the rst period. However,
when the social damage from preemptively developing land is su¢ ciently high, it is
always benecial to compromise to each individual landowner so to prevent them
from preemption.
In general, however, it might be problematic for the regulator to di¤erentiate poli-
cies across landowners. If he cannot di¤erentiate  2 across landowners, it again follows
from Lemma 2 that regulation can only be optimal at levels  2 2 fE2;  21; : : : ;  2ng.
Here, a reduction in  2 leads to welfare losses from those landowners who do not
develop in period 1 and for whom a reduction in the tax rate distorts their second
period decisions. One could however obtain a welfare gain from reducing the number
of preempting landowners.
This immediately shows that for the determination of the optimal regulation level,
the distribution of types is decisive:
Proposition 2 A perfectly informed regulator who cannot di¤erentiate policies across
landowners, chooses  2 2 fE2;  21; : : : ;  2ng. The optimal decision crucially depends on




To illustrate how the optimal regulation level depends on the distribution of types,
I derive analytical results for the case in which landowners can only be of two di¤erent
types L and H ( 2L < 
2
H); the number of the respective types is denoted by nL and
nH . For simplicity, I assume that E1 > (E2    2i )(1   G(V 2i +  2i )), i.e. it is always
benecial to reduce the tax rate marginally if this induces additional landowners
to refrain from preemption. Furthermore, I assume  2L < E
2 such that (at least)
landowners of low type preempt at  2 = E2.
Dening  2H = min[
2
H ; E
2], I then have to compare the welfare at  2 2 f 2L;  2Hg.
With conditions (4.9) and (4.11), I obtain:
lim
2"2H
W ( 2) < lim
2"2L
W ( 2)
, nH [OS(V 2H ;  2H) OS(V 2H ;  2L)| {z }
>0
] < nL[E
1   (E2    2L)(1 G(V 2L +  2L))| {z }
0
](4.16)
which shows that it is welfare-maximizing to choose  2 =  2L if and only if the number
of low type players is su¢ ciently large. In other words, the benets from preventing a
su¢ cient number of low types from preemption must be large enough to compensate
for the welfare loses from distorted second-period decisions of high type landowners.
Note that condition (4.16) will also hold for a given number of high and low types, if
the threshold levels  2L and 
2
H are su¢ ciently close to each other.
To further illustrate these analytical results and Proposition 2, I now discuss
simulations for di¤erent distributions of types. I use the following example: E1 =
E2 = 50, V 1D = 55 and second period land values v
2 uniformly distributed in [0; 100].
I x VL = V 1L = V
2




H  V 2L .
Figures 4.3 and 4.4 illustrate the social welfare at di¤erent level of  2 when VH 2
f8; 20g and nL = 2, nH = 3. For these values, all landowners preempt when regulator
sets  2 = 50. A reduction in  2 from 50 reduces social welfare until high type
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Figure 4.3: Illustration of welfare as a function of 2 for VH = 8, VL = 5, nH = 3, nL = 2,
E1 = E2 = 50
landowners decide not to develop land in period 1, i.e. until  2 =  2H . Similarly, a
discontinuity occurs when the preemption threshold  2L is reached for type L. It can
be seen from the gures that the optimal regulation level crucially depends on the
distribution of types: when VL = 5 and VH = 8 as in Figure 4.3, the welfare gain
from preventing low type landowners from preemption just outweighs the welfare
loss from reducing  2 to  2L. It is optimal for regulator to compromise so that no
landowner will preempt. However, if VH = 20 and thereby VH is su¢ ciently larger
than VL (Figure 4.4), the welfare gain from preventing the low type from preempting
no longer outweighs the welfare loss, and it is optimal to regulate at  2H and let low
type players preempt.
The optimal regulation for a given VH and VL crucially depends on the distribution
of types, i.e. on the fraction nL=(nH +nL) of low types (see equation (4.16)). For any
combination of VH and VL, condition (4.16) denes a threshold value ~fL such that
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Figure 4.4: Illustration of welfare as a function of 2 for VH = 20, VL = 5, nH = 3, nL = 2,
E1 = E2 = 50
regulation at  2 =  2H is optimal for nL=(nH + nL) < ~f while regulation at 
2 =  2L
is optimal for nL=(nH + nL) > ~f . This threshold value is illustrated in Figure 4.5 for
VL = 5 and VH 2 [5; 100]. Interestingly, this threshold value is non-monotonic in VH .
The intuition is that the second-period distortions for high types from choosing  2L
instead of  2H , i.e.
OS(VH ; 
2





[V 2H   v2D + E2]dG(v2D)
depend on both the value di¤erence between V 2H and the realized development value
v2D, and the probability of development in the second period 1   G(V 2H +  2) at the
two regulation levels. While the former is increasing in VH , the latter is decreasing in
VH . In the extreme, when G(V 2H) = 1, changing the tax rate for H does not matter
at all as these landowners will never develop land.3
3Therefore, ~f = 0 for VH + L  100 in the example in Figure 4.5.
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Figure 4.5: Illustration of optimal uniform regulation and threshold values ffL for the ratio
nL=(nL + nH) as a function of VH (VL = 5, E1 = E2 = 50)
In Figure 4.6 and 4.7, I relax the assumption of having two types of landowners.
I add a medium type VM besides the low and high types (nL = 2, nH = 2, nM = 1).
In Figure 4.6, the median type has value VL = 5  VM  20 = V 2H . From Figure
4.5, I know that the optimal regulation level is given by  2H both if VM = 20 and if
VM = 5. However, for intermediate levels of VM , the optimal regulation is di¤erent:
it is still optimal to regulate at  2H when VM is below approximately 10, i.e. when it
would be too costly to compromise to a level which brings typeM out of preemption.
Compromising to  2 =  2M is, however, worthwhile if VM is su¢ ciently close to VH .
In this case, the optimal regulation is therefore non-monotonic in VH as depicted in
Figure 4.6. This is di¤erent for smaller levels of VH : in Figure 4.7, I chose VH = 10
such that regulation at  2 =  2L is optimal if VM = VL, while 
2 =  2H results if
VM = VH . It is again optimal to regulate at  2L if VM is small ( 8:1) while it
becomes optimal to regulate at  2M when VM is su¢ ciently large. Intuitively, in this
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Figure 4.6: Optimal regulation 2 as a function of VM (VH = 20, VL = 5, nH = 2, nL = 2,
nM = 1, E1 = E2 = 50)
case, the second period distortions for type H are smaller than the welfare gains from
preventing M from preempting.
Figures 4.6 and 4.7 thereby nicely illustrate the sensitivity of optimal regulation
to the distribution of landownersvalues. Unless the regulator is perfectly informed
about the landowners types, he can therefore hardly design an optimal policy. I
therefore now turn to the case when the regulator is not perfectly informed about the
types of specic landowners.
4.3.5 Asymmetric information
I rst consider the case of individual regulation where regulation can di¤er between
landowners. I again concentrate on the case of two potential player types of L and
H. The probability that the landowner is type i 2 fL;Hg with values V ti in both
periods and induced threshold value  2i is denoted by fi.
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Figure 4.7: Optimal regulation 2 as a function of VM (VH = 10, VL = 5, nH = 2, nL = 2,
nM = 1, E1 = E2 = 50)




d1(i;  2)(V 1D   E1) + (1  d1(i;  2))(V 1i +OS(V 2i ;  2))

where d1(vi;  1;  2) is a dummy variable for the development decision and d1(vi;  1;  2) =
1 if landowner i develops in the rst period. Due to my assumption of linear dam-
ages, the optimality condition resembles the decision for multiple landowners in the
previous section (see condition (4.16)). If  2i  E2, nobody would preempt and the
optimal regulation is  2 = E2. Again denoting  2H = min[
2
H ; E




W (0;  2) < lim
2"2L
W (0;  2) (4.17)
, fH [OS(V 2H ;  2H) OS(V 2H ;  2L)| {z }
>0
] < fL[E
1   (E2    2L)(1 G(V 2L +  2L))| {z }
0
](4.18)
such that the regulator would lean towards regulating at level  2 =  2i if the prob-
ability that a landowner is of type i is su¢ ciently high. Note however that there is
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potential for mistake: if the regulator chooses  2 =  2H , a low type landowner will pre-
empt and thereby potentially cause large externalities in the rst period. If  2 =  2L
is chosen but the landowner turns out to be of high type, his second period decisions
will be distorted towards increased development such that again welfare losses result.
I therefore now study if the regulator can improve upon the welfare generated
by a decision under asymmetric information (given by (4.18)). I consider a signaling
approach where the regulator o¤ers two regulation menus which the landowner can
choose: (pi;  i) (i 2 fL;Hg) where pi is an ex ante fee that the landowner has to pay
in order to face regulation  2 =  i in the second period.
This menu must satisfy the individual incentive compatibility constraint (IC).
That is, the expected prot for type i landowner should be larger under (pi;  i) than
under the alternative regulation schedule:




i ;  i)]  pi  max[V 1D; V 1i +O(V 2i ;  j)]  pj (4.19)
for i 2 fL;Hg and j 6= i. I show the following lemma:
Lemma 3 Any non-trivial incentive compatible mechanisms (pi;  i)i must satisfy ei-
ther
(i)  i <  2i and, L < H , pL > pH , and
V 1L +O(V
2
L ; L) max[V 1D; V 1L +O(V 2L ; H)] (4.20)
 pL   pH  O(V 2H ; L) O(V 2H ; H)  0 (4.21)
or





H ; H)] max[V 1D; V 1H +O(V 2H ; L)]
 pH   pL  max[V 1D; V 1L +O(V 2L ; H)]  V 1D
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Proof of Lemma 3:
(a) Assume that H   2H . Then both types would preempt when choosing regulation





L ; L)]  pL  V 1D   pH  max[V 1D; V 1H +O(V 2H ; L)]  pL
which contradicts Lemma 1 as O(v2; L) is increasing in v2 and V tH  V tL for t = 1; 2.
(b) Assume that L   2L. If H > L, low type would preempt under both regula-
tion levels such that incentive compatibility requires pL < pH . This, however, would
violate the (IC) for the high type since the lower tax (L < H) could be achieved
with a lower payment (pL < pH). If, however, L > H , incentive compatibility for
low types would require
V 1D   pL  max[V 1D; V 1L +O(V 2L ; H)]  pH





H ; H)]  pH  max[V 1D; V 1H +O(V 2H ; L)]  pL
immediately leading to the claimed relationship in (ii).
(c) In the remaining case of  i   2i for i 2 fL;Hg, the (IC) immediately gives
condition (4.21). With Lemma 1, the option value is increasing in v2 but decreasing
in  2 with a positive cross derivative. I therefore obtain L < H and pL > pH .
Note that I allow for positive and negative values of  i. That is, in the extreme case
the taxwould turn into a subsidy. While Lemma 3 characterizes the set of incentive
compatible mechanisms, the regulator is interested in choosing the mechanism which
maximizes welfare. For this reason I can immediately rule out the mechanisms which
are characterized in Lemma 3 (ii) as they would be dominated by a regulation at
 2 = max[ 2H ; E
2] (see Lemma 2). It remains to study mechanisms given by Lemma 3
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(i) and condition (4.21). Here, it is obvious that any mechanism with H   2L would
be dominated in welfare terms by a uniform regulation of  2 =  2L (again Lemma 2).
I therefore have to compare the trivial mechanisms H = L =  2i for i 2 fL;Hg
with those given in Lemma 3 (i) with L <  2L and 
2
L < H < 
2
H . I rst establish
existence:
Lemma 4 For any given L <  2L, there exists incentive compatible mechanisms
( i; pi)i. They are characterized by:
V 1L +O(V
2
L ; L)  V 1D  pL   pH  O(V 2H ; L) O(V 2H ; H) (4.22)
with  2L < H  ̂ 2H(L) where ̂ 2H = ̂ 2H(L) is implicitly dened by
V 1L +O(V
2
L ; L)  V 1D = O(V 2H ; L) O(V 2H ; ̂ 2H)
Proof of Lemma 4:
Dene pi such that pL   pH = V 1L + O(V 2L ; L)   V 1D which is larger than zero for





2)   V 1D   [O(V 2H ;  2)   O(V 2H ;  2L)]
is decreasing in  2 for  2 <  2L and takes a value of zero at 
2 =  2L. Therefore,
pL   pH = V 1L + O(V 2L ; L)   V 1D > O(V 2H ; L)   O(V 2H ;  2L). As the option value is
decreasing in  2, any such mechanism with  2L < H  ̂ 2H is incentive-compatible. 
Figure 4.8 demonstrates the incentive compatible mechanisms proposed by Lemma
4. As a high tax level harms landowners private benet, high type of landowner
always has incentives to mimic low type and low type of landowner would always
want to reveal his true type. Therefore, regulators problem is to prevent high type
of landowner from claiming to be the low type. For a tax level L <  2L, the private
benet from having L instead of  2 >  2i are given in the gure by AB for a low type
landowner and by AC for the high type. When the regulator asks a price pL =AB for
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Figure 4.8: Illustration of incentive compatible mechanism
the tax level L, low-type landowners net benet from claiming to be the low type
is zero. However, high-type landowner would gain a net benet of BC by pretending
to be the low type and paying pL.
In order to provide incentives for high-type landowners to reveal their true type,
the regulator has to set tax H at such level that net benet for high-type landowner
from revealing his true type is no smaller than that from claiming himself to be the
low type (which is BC in Figure 4.8). Any tax level for high type that falls in the
range of ( 2L; ̂
2
H(L)] can provide such net benet level. The tax level ̂
2
H(L) with
a price pH = 0 make the high type indi¤erent between revealing his true type or
pretending to be a low type. Here, high type landowners earn a net benet EF that
equals to BC from telling his true type. For any tax level that is smaller than ̂ 2H(L)
but larger than  2L, a positive price exists that provides high type of landowner a net
benet that is no smaller than BC or EF, such that high type landowners would be
willing to reveal their type. The regulator can set the price of pL < AB such that low
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type of landowner gains a strictly positive net benet from revealing his true type,
which is part of the mechanism proposed by Lemma 4.
Note that in case that the landowner is type H, welfare is increasing in  2 for
 2 <  2H . For a given L < 
2
L, Lemma 4 therefore implies that the welfare optimum
among mechanism with (L; H) is given by (L; ̂
2
H(L)) with appropriate ex ante
prices satisfying pL   pH = V 1L +O(V 2L ; L)  V 1D.
I can use this result to analyze the conditions under which such a mechanism is
welfare improving compared with a uniform tax, i.e. a trivial mechanism, of  2 =  2i
for i = L or i = H.
Expected welfare under a mechanism (L; H) with H = ̂
2









i ;  2)  (E2    i)(1 G(V 2i +  i))

(4.23)
In order to compare the welfare with regulating at  2 =  2L it proves helpful to consider










where with the denition of H = ̂
2




G(V 2L + L) G(V 2H + L)
1 G(V 2H + H)
With these preliminaries, I can show the following result:
Proposition 3 By o¤ering a mechanism which gives landowners the chance to re-
ceive a lower tax rate when paying an ex ante fee, the regulator can increase expected
welfare if fL 2 (ffL;cfL), where ffL = [OS(V 2H ;2H) OS(V 2H ;2L)][E1 (E2 2L)(1 G(V 2L+2L)]+[OS(V 2H ;2H) OS(V 2H ;2L)] andcfL = g(V 2H+2L)(G(V 2H+2L) G(V 2L+2L))g(V 2L+2L)(1 G(V 2H+2L))+g(V 2H+2L)(G(V 2H+2L) G(V 2L+2L)) .
126
Proof of Proposition 3:
I derive the conditions under which social welfare can be improved. Consider a
situation where a uniform regulation at  2 =  2L leads to larger expected welfare than
 2 =  2H (see condition (4.18)). Note that, independent of the value distribution,
this would be the case if E1 is su¢ ciently large. The condition (4.18) implies that
regulator choose to regulate at  2 =  2L if the regulators prior belief that landowner
is low type is su¢ cient high:
fL >
[OS(V 2H ; 
2
H) OS(V 2H ;  2L)]
[E1   (E2    2L)(1 G(V 2L +  2L)] + [OS(V 2H ;  2H) OS(V 2H ;  2L)]
Dene the critical fL above which  2 =  2L dominates 
2 =  2H as ffL.
ffL = [OS(V 2H ;  2H) OS(V 2H ;  2L)]
[E1   (E2    2L)(1 G(V 2L +  2L)] + [OS(V 2H ;  2H) OS(V 2H ;  2L)]
A su¢ cient condition under which a deviation from  2 =  2L via my mechanisms
is benecial, is given by EW 0( 2L) < 0 as dened in (4.24):
EW 0( 2L)
1 G(V 2H +  2L)





L)(1 G(V 2H +  2L))
 fHg(V 2H +  2L)(G(V 2H +  2L) G(V 2L +  2L))
My mechanism improve social welfare requires that:
EW 0( 2L) < 0
, fLg(V 2L +  2L)(1 G(V 2H +  2L)) < fHg(V 2H +  2L)(G(V 2H +  2L) G(V 2L +  2L))
, fL <






L) G(V 2L +  2L))
g(V 2L + 
2
L)(1 G(V 2H +  2L)) + g(V 2H +  2L)(G(V 2H +  2L) G(V 2L +  2L))
which shows that as long as fL, i.e. the probability of the landowner being a low type
is su¢ ciently small, one can improve welfare upon a undi¤erentiated tax regulation
at  2 =  2L.
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Dene the critical value fL below which the incentive compatible mechanisms
dominate regulating at  2 =  2L as cfL,
cfL = g(V 2H +  2L)(G(V 2H +  2L) G(V 2L +  2L))
g(V 2L + 
2
L)(1 G(V 2H +  2L)) + g(V 2H +  2L)(G(V 2H +  2L) G(V 2L +  2L))
Combine cfL and ffL, it is clear that my incentive compatible mechanisms improve
social welfare if and only if ffL < cfL. 
The proof of Proposition 3 demonstrates that whencfL is su¢ ciently large orffL is
su¢ ciently small, mechanisms which o¤er di¤erentiated treatments based on di¤erent
ex ante payments increase welfare compared to a undi¤erentiated tax treatment at
 2 =  2L or 
2 =  2H . A su¢ ciently highcfL requires a su¢ ciently large di¤erence in Vis
between high and low type. A su¢ ciently smallffL requires that the welfare gain from
a lower tax rate is su¢ ciently larger than the welfare loss, or, E1 is su¢ ciently large.
The welfare gain is the avoided negative externality due to low type of landowners
decision change, or the reduction in rst period distortion. The welfare loss is the
reduced expected social welfare from high type of landowners developing land in
second period, or the increment in second period distortion.
Figure 4.9 demonstrates a scenario where my mechanism improves welfare and
Figure 4.10 it does not. In both gures I assume again V ti follows a uniform dis-
tribution dened in symmetric information scenario, and E1 = E2 = 50. I set
V 1L = V
2




H = VH = 75 in Figure 4.9. The expected
social welfare curve of the incentive compatible mechanism merges into that of un-
di¤erentiated tax  2L as the fL increases. The social welfare from the mechanism,
(L; ̂
2
H(L)), and undi¤erentiated tax 
2
L are smaller than that from 
2
H in the lower
ranger of fL. However, the di¤erence between the two decreases and become negative
with fL. The intersection (ffL) of the social welfare curve for the undi¤erentiated tax
 2L and 
2
H is to the left of the point (cfL) where social welfare curve of (L; ̂ 2H(L))
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Figure 4.9: Illustration of incentive compatible mechanism improves welfare (VH = 70,
VL = 23, E1 = E2 = 50)
merges into that from the undi¤erentiated tax  2L. Therefore, I have a range of fL
in which the regulation (L; ̂
2





In Figure 4.10 (VL = 5 and VH = 43), the social welfare curve of my mechanism
merges into that of regulating at  2L to the left of the point where the social welfare
curve of  2L intersects with the curve of 
2
H , which leaves no a feasible range for the
mechanism.
As implied by Proposition 3, the mechanism is benecial only when the rst
period negative externality or the di¤erence in types is su¢ ciently large. Figure
4.11 demonstrates the optimal regulatory decisions associated with the distribution
of landowners type and regulators prior belief of landowners type. I x again
E1 = E2 = 50, and choose VL = 5 as in the perfect information case and again
allow VH to take values VH 2 [VL; 100]. Identical to Figure 4.5, the threshold value
for VH above which regulation at  2H is optimal depends on the distribution of types,
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Figure 4.10: Illustration of incentive compatible mechanism does not improve welfare (VH =
43, VL = 5, E1 = E2 = 50)
here on the probability fL = 1 fH of facing a low type. The threshold value f̂ which
denes the maximal fL for which the mechanism approach increases expected welfare
compared to regulation at  2L is increasing in VH . If VH is su¢ ciently large, ~f < f̂
such that there is a range of intermediate probabilities fL such that my proposed
mechanism can improve welfare compare with both a regulation at  2H and 
2
L. The
range for which my mechanism improves welfare is even larger, if the externality E1
is larger that E2, that is, if preemption leads to signicantly larger social costs. This
is illustrated in Figure 4.12 where I choose E1 = 2E2 = 100. Then, my mechanism
dominates undi¤erentiated regulation for any VH > 20.
Proposition 3 therefore shows that in the case of asymmetric information, the
regulator should not necessarily treat landowners in an undi¤erentiated way. Instead,
he can o¤er landowners reduced development costs if they pay a specied amount ex
ante. By this, the landowners voluntarily sort into di¤erent tax treatments. Those
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Figure 4.11: Optimal regulation (uniform at 2L, 
2
H or mechanism (L, b2H(L)) as a func-
tion of VH and fL = 1  fH (VL = 5, E1 = E2 = 50)
Figure 4.12: Optimal regulation (uniform at 2L, 
2
H or mechanism (L, b2H(L)) as a func-
tion of VH and fL = 1  fH (VL = 5, E1 = 2E2 = 100)
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who are more likely to preempt, pay money in order to receive a reduced tax for
development in period 2.
With this, the structure of the signaling game resembles lobbying of landowners
for a reduction in the regulatory stringency level. Note however that I assumed
that the ex ante payments (alias negotiation expenses) are welfare neutral, i.e. are
not associated with additional social costs. I can therefore reinterpret my result as
a version of socially benecial lobbying. Instead of announcing a undi¤erentiated
regulation in the second period which might lead some landowners into preemption,
the regulator should be open to compromise with those landowners who take on ex
ante expenses to credibly demonstrate that a high regulation would lead them into
preemption.
4.4 Conclusions and Discussion
The Endangered Species Act has been arousing much discussion and opposition as
it takes or limits land development right without compensation. Although the ESA
is somewhat tamed through introducing the section 10(a) which allows landowners
to develop land after submitting a HCP, it creates incentives for preemptive habitat
destruction and at the same time is criticized from environmentalists for its com-
promise. The questions are: is compromise the right strategy and how should the
compromise be regulated?
I answer the two questions using a two-period land develop model. The condition
is derived under which regulator has to compromise in order to reduce preemption
and improve social welfare. When preemptive land development harms social welfare
more than does developing land in post-regulation period, compromise can be better
than rst-best regulation. This condition, however, is di¢ cult to apply to the real
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world as it requires that regulator knows perfectly the landownersprivately known
propensity to preemptively develop land. A mechanism is proposed that enables regu-
lator to reveal landownersprivate information by providing di¤erentiated regulation
to di¤erent types of landowners. This mechanism allows an individual landowner to
choose to pay ex ante for a less stringent regulation. It can potentially improve social
welfare over undi¤erentiated regulation.
The mechanism provides a new rationales for the designation of HCP. HCP is the
product of a long and elaborate negotiation among landowners, Fish and Wildlife
Service and other interest groups. Instead of prohibiting any land development after
regulation takes e¤ect, the ESA should allow the landowners who otherwise would
preemptively develop land to exert e¤ort (time, money and so on) to submit an exten-
sive Habitat Conservation Plan in order to gain a lower future land development cost.
This type of compromise through di¤erentiated treatment of regulation, may still be
imperfect, can improve social welfare than the undi¤erentiated way or prohibiting
any land development.
In this chapter, I simplify the problem by assuming that there are only two time
periods and regulatory status jumps from no regulation at all in the rst period to
regulating at a specic level in the second period. If putting in a continuous time
framework, the regulator can take advantage of the timing of private land development
for each individual landowners: low type of landowners develop land earlier than the
high types. Regulator can then set a regulatory stringency level at a time point to
the threshold level for the type for whom it is optimal to develop land. By doing so,
regulator can avoid preemptive development of high types of landowners due to an
unnecessarily high regulatory stringency level at that time point. I therefore foresee
that gradually increasing regulatory stringency level that is compatible to landowners
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threshold level over time would be e¤ective in preventing preemption.
The basic story in this paper, that changing in regulatory status induces preemp-
tive behavior, should not be restricted only to the case of Endangered Species Act. It
applies to any change in regulation, policy, rule and even price or the availability of a
commodity. The uncertainty associated with those changes before they actually are
realized could induce individuals to take preemptive actions to reduce the expected
losses. The preemptive behavior should not be worried if it does not generate any
negative externality to the society. For example, suspected increase in commodity
price induces consumers to purchase more before the price is actually increased and
does not cost social benets. However, it will become a problem if the preemptive
behavior is irreversible and costs social welfare, such as preemptive land development
induced by any regulation or policy change. Endangered Species Act is only one case,
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